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The Competitive Aspects of Utility Participation
in Solar Development
WILLIAM H. LAWRENCE* & JOHN H. MINAN**
The development of renewable and essentially inexhaustible sources of
energy is essential to the economic growth and stability of the United
States.' As concern over the environmental impact of using fossil fuels or
nuclear energy increases, and the costs of conventional energy forms
steadily rise,2 the need to develop alternative energy sources is com-
pelling.3 One such alternative with substantial promise is solar energy.4
The sun is our most abundant source of energy; each day enough sunlight
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Oil imports in 1976 averaged 7.3 million barrels per day. In February, 1977
imports amounted to 9.6 million barrels per day. The Administration projects
that without timely corrective measures, U.S. demand for imported oil is
likely to be in the range of 12 to 16 million barrels per day in 1985. It is ques-
tionable whether the world's oil exporting countries will be able to satisfy
that level of demand at reasonable prices. But even if they can, we believe it is
clearly not in this Nation's interests to import so much of our energy needs.
We must lessen the demand.
H.R. REP. No. 95-496, Pt. 4 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1977) (hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT).
"'Residential electric bills alone have gone up 72 per cent in the last five years." Sweet,
Meeting the Research Needs of State Regulators, 102 PuB. UTIL FORT.. Aug. 17, 1978, at
11. Between 1969 and 1975 average residential electric rates increased by 54%. Because of
increased consumption as well, the average bill rose 91%. Samuelson, Battle Lines Are
Being Generated for Reforn of Electric Utility Rates, 8 NAT'L J. 1474 (1976).
3in conjunction with the National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Congress made the
following findings:
The Congress finds that (1) the United States faces an energy shortage
arising from increasing demand for energy, particularly for oil and natural
gas, and insufficient domestic supplies of oil and natural gas to satisfy that
demand; (2) unless effective measures are promptly taken by the Federal
Government and other users of energy to reduce the rate of growth of demand
for energy, the United States will become increasingly dependent on the
world oil market, increasingly vulnerable to interruptions of foreign oil
supplies, and unable to provide the energy to meet further needs; and (3) all
sectors of our Nation's economy must begin immediately to significantly
reduce the demand for nonrenewable energy resources such as oil and natural
gas by implementing and maintaining effective conservation measures for the
efficient use of these and other energy sources.
National Energy Conservation Policy Act, PuB. L. No. 95-619, §102, 92 Stat. 3208-09
(1978).
'Increased use of solar energy is a national energy goah
For long-term economic growth, the United States will have to make
increasing use of renewable and essentially inexhaustible energy sources as
substitutes for declining fossil fuel resources. One of the major renewable
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falls on the earth to satisfy mankind's energy needs for fifteen years.'
While solar power may soon be the fastest growing part of our energy
supply,6 the utilization of solar equipment is presently at an early stage
of development. The extent of solar use in the future will be largely deter-
mined by the relationship of the utilities to solar energy. The utilities are
in the unique position to directly affect the economics of solar use, and
thus determine the viability of the emerging solar industry. One should
not assume that utilities will react uniformly to competition from solar
systems, nor that reaction will always be adverse. The character of each
utility's reaction will be determined by the number and type of solar
systems operating within its energy market and by a variety of other
practical, economic, and legal considerations. Utilities may be either a
barrier to the development of solar technology or an active participant in
its harmonious integration into our energy structure. The purpose of this
article is to analyze the various types of potential competitive interaction
between the utilities and the solar industry which may affect the degree
of solar utilization in our society.
The article is divided into an Introduction and three Parts. Since the
analysis of the interface between solar energy and the public utilities will
depend largely on the type of solar system, a brief introduction to solar
technology is provided. Part I of the article examines how utility pricing
policies and rules will shape consumer reaction and, as a consequence,
determine the economic feasibility of supplying or manufacturing solar
equipment. Solar energy systems generally require an auxilliary energy
source to provide backup service, which in all but unusual cases will be
provided by a utility.7 The economic benefit of using a solary system will
be reflected in a reduced utility bill. The amount of any reduction
depends, however, on the price charged by the utility for the backup ser-
vice. The rates for supplemental service will thus significantly determine
the economic feasibility of using solar equipment.8
The focus in Part II is on the competitive aspects of the utilization of a
single solar system by multiple users. The utilities can be viewed as the
competitors of multi-user solar systems. The owners of shared systems
may attempt to enter into direct competition with a utility by obtaining
"public utility" status or may choose to operate within the utility's
service area without seeking this status. In either event, the solar ap-
resource technologies currently available is that involving solar heating and
cooling. The goal of increased residential use of solar energy reflects the
desirability of achieving widespread use of solar energy to displace the con-
ventional fuels used for space conditioning and water heating homes.
HOUSE REPORT. supra, note 1, at 17.
'BUSINESS WEEK. Oct. 9, 1978, at 92.
6Id. at 90.
'Thomas, Miller and Robbins, Overcoming Legal Uncertainties About Use of Solar
Energy, 1978 AM. B. FOUNDATION 18.8A detailed analysis of utility pricing for solar backup service is provided in Lawrence &
Minan, Solar Energy and Public Utility Rate Regulation, 26 U.C.L.A. L. REV. - (1979).
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plication competes with the utility and potentially reduces some portion
of its present or projected energy market. The ramifications of this situa-
tion are considered in Part II.
Part III of the article analyzes the possibility of utilities becoming
directly involved in the marketing of solar equipment, and considers fur-
ther the alternatives under which this type of activity might occur.
Essentially three options are available: the utilities could be given a
monopoly over commercialization activities; they could be prohibited
from participation; or they could be allowed to compete with other solar
equipment suppliers. Each of these options is analyzed. The commer-
cialization of solar equipment by the utilities would be controversial;9 it
may also produce a dilemma, since the need to develop viable alternative
energy souces may demand the vigorous participation of the utilities to
encourage solar use, while the policy of favoring competition may de-
mand just the opposite.
INTRODUCTION
Solar energy is both direct and indirect. Direct forms create energy by
the action of sunlight on solar collectors, whereas indirect forms are addi-
tional energy sources made possible by solar insolation, such as wind
energy, plant biomass fuels,10 and ocean thermal conversions." A
distinction is also made between active and passive applications. An ac-
tive solar unit is primarily an engineering system that transfers collected
energy by mechanical or other means from the collector to the point of
use. An active solar unit usually requires an auxiliary energy source to
provide power when sunlight is not available and its storage capacity
is depleted. In most instances this will-be provided by a public utility. A
passive method is essentially architectural in nature. It utilizes solar
energy through manipulation of the relationship between a structure and
the outside environment.12 The principal focus in this article is on direct,
'Controversy also follows the involvement of energy companies in the private sector. See
Braden, Corporations and Their Monopoly on the Sun, The Wash. Post, March 6, 1976, §A
at 17, col. 5. The oil industry in particular has shown interest in solar energy technology
and has invested heavily in it. Shell Oil Will Invest a Further $3.6 Million in Solar Energy
Firm, The Wall St. J., Jan. 2, 1976, at 3, col. 3; Gapay, Oil Firms Fear Moves to Bar Their
Owning Other Energy Sources, The Wall St. J., May 25, 1977, at 1, col. 6. For a good
discussion of diversification of oil companies into other segments of the energy industry
see Note, Horizontal Integration In the Energy Industry, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 941 (1977).
"OBioconversion to fuels includes the production of organic matter (biomass) and its con-
version to a variety of clean fuel products and other useful clean energy forms. Sources of
biomass include urban solid wate, argicultural residues, and terrestrial and marine energy
crops. 1 FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, PROJECT INDEPENDENCE: SOLAR ENERGY
(1974)(hereinafter cited as FEDERAL ENERGY ADMIN.).
"The purpose of ocean thermal conversion is to establish the technical, economic, and
geopolitical feasibility of large-scale floating power plants capable of converting ocean
thermal energy into electrical energy. Id. at VI-1.
"See generally, Minan & Lawrence, State Tax Incentives to Promote the Use of Solar




The technical sophistication of active solar systems covers a con-
siderable range. The flat plate collector uses a black chrome plate or other
dark surface to absorb heat which is then transferred by a liquid or air to
the point of use or storage facility. Solar systems typically use tanks of
water, bins of rocks, or other materials to retain heat for later use.13 These
systems are simple devices at the bottom rung on the ladder of technical
sophistication in solar hardware. Currently they can cost from as little as
$1000 for a simple hot water system to as much as $15,000 for one
capable of supplying up to 70 percent of the total heating and hot water
needs for a typical 2000 square foot house. 14 Although flat plate
collectors are usable in some industrial processes, technical limitations
on their ability to efficiently operate at temperatures above 1400 F. are
likely to confine their use to hot water and space heating in residential
and commercial buildings. 15
Instead of a flat plate collector, an evacuated tube collector can be
used. This type of collector has a pair of concentric glass tubes separated
by a vacuum. The blackened inside tube absorbs solar radiation and
passes the heat to the central pipe which is filled with fluid. The vacuum-
seal design works as an efficient insulator since it is impervious to am-
bient temperatures or wind. Such a system can capture twice as much
energy per unit area as a flat plate system, but is also approximately
twice as expensive. Because of the greater efficiency, evacuated tubes are
capable of producing higher temperatures, making solar air-conditioning
technologically possible.16
Solar photovoltaic power systems (PEPS) use semi-conductor
materials to convert sunlight directly into electricity. Since the conver-
sion is into direct current, power inverters are required to assure com-
patibility with alternating current. 7 These systems offer the potential for
highly reliable power in a variety of applications ranging from small, low-
power instruments in remote areas to large central power stations.
Modular installation allows the creation of a facility of practically any
size. At present, two problems exist with this type of application:
13FEDERAL ENERGY ADMIN.. supra note 10, at 11-5 - 11-6.
14BUSINESS WEEK. supra note 5, at 92.
System costs vary a great deal because families and individuals have dif-
ferent energy demands and because there are a wide variety of systems on the
market. The average installed cost of a flatplate water heater for a house in
California is about $1,700 - $2,000. Family-size pool heaters cost between
$1,000 and $3,000. Active space heaters cost between $3,000 and $10,000. For
all these systems, you can cut the cost in half if you do it yourself. A well done
passive solar heating system can add as little as $700 to the cost of a new
house.
STATE OF CALIFORNIA (SOLARCAL OFFICE), CALIFORNIA: THE SOLAR CAPITOL. How TO
FINANCE A SOLAR ENERGY SYSTEM FOR YOUR HOME 1 (1978).
"BUSINESS WEEK. supra note 5, at 92.
161d
"FEDERAL ENERGY ADMIN.. supra note 10, at VII-19.
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efficiency and cost.18 No current photovoltaic cells have achieved an
efficiency greater than 13 percent. 19 Research reported during the sum-
mer of 1978 predicts, however, efficiences as high as 40 percent, so the ef-
ficiency problem may be solvable.2 0 Silicon-cell arrays, which are the
photovoltaic front runner, can produce electricity for about $10 per watt
during peak conditions.2 ' While the cost of photovoltaic generation of
electricity is not presently competitive with conventional power, it has
dropped tenfold in just three years. In addition, Congress recently ap-
proved the Federal Photovoltaic Utilization Act of 1978 which should
provide a major boost to the photovoltaic industry.2 2 Its purpose is to
establish a photovoltaic energy commercialization program for the ac-
celerated procurement and installation of photovoltaic solar electric
systems in federal facilities.3 The Act appropriated $98 million for the
fiscal years beginning October 1, 1978, and ending September 30, 1981.24
This impetus could enable solar electricity to compete with utility-
produced electricity.
25
Solar Thermal Conversion systems (STC) initially convert sunlight to
high temperature heat which is then typically used as the energy input
for the generation of electricity. 26 High temperatures are obtained by con-
centrating sunlight on a focal point. The power tower is an illustration of
this type of technology. The power tower uses a ring of sun-tracking
heliostats surrounding a tower to focus the sun's rays on a vat of fluid
located on top of the tower. The heat transferred to the working fluid is
then used in a thermodynamic cycle. The concentrated sunlight produces
temperatures which are high enough to drive turbine-generators and pro-
duce electricity. A pilot power tower project near Barstow, California will
use 2000 heliostats and be capable of generating temperatures as high as
10000 F. The Barstow power tower will cost about $12,000 per kilowatt
to build. The comparable investment for a coal-fired plant is about $1700
"Id. at VII-16 through 17.
19BUSINESS WEEK, supra note 5, at 96.
20A center for gallium arsenide research announced it had achieved efficiencies as high as
28.5%, and that company researchers think that efficiencies could one day go higher than
40%. 1d at 99.
2'&, at 96. Deputy Energy Secretary John O'Leary indicated that the cost is now at
about $12 per peak watt. 4 SOLAR ENERGY INTELL. REP. 347 (1979).
"2The Federal Photovoltaic Utilization Act is §§561-69 of Pt. 4 of Tit. V of National
Energy Conservation Policy Act, Pub. L. No. 95-619, §102, 92 Stat. 3208-09 (1978).
"Id. at § 563.
"Id. at § 569.
"The Federal Photovoltaic Utilization Act provides, in part, that:
IThe Secretary shall insure that such systems reflect to the maximum extent
practicable the most advanced and reliable technologies and shall schedule
purchases in a manner which will stimulate the early development of a perma-
nent low-cost private photovoltaic production capability in the United States,
and to stimulate the private sector market for photovoltaic power systems.
Id. § 567(a).
The Energy Department has set a 1986 goal of reducing the cost of photovoltaics to $.50
per peak watt. BUSINESS WEEK. supra note 5, at 96.
26FEDERAL ENERGY ADMIN.. supra note 10, at 111-1, 111-6 through 111-14.
19791
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
per kilowatt, including both construction costs and the present value of
fuel computed over a thirty year period.27 Hopefully further power tower
research will enable costs to fall considerably.
The role of solar energy as a supplemental energy source will have a
significant effect on utilities. The flat plate solar technology is likely to
be used principally by an individual capturing energy for his own use.
The competitive interface with the utility is likely to occur through the
utility rate structure for backup service. The development of an economic
STC system is not likely to change the utility's traditional role since they
will be large systems which fulfill the same function and fit into utility
operations in the same manner as do conventional systems. The principal
impact will be on lower fuel costs for the utility. Direct conversion of
sunlight into energy through PEPS could significantly affect the
utilities. Economies of scale are not present with photovoltaics; thus, the
cost of one kilowatt of capacity will be about the same for either a small
or large PEPS facility.18 Since transmission costs could be avoided
through the use of small facilities, neighborhood or on-site generating
stations become a likelihood. Unless the utilities invest in these small-
scale operations, their role might be reduced to the provision of back-up
power for cloudy periods or nighttime. A breakthrough in photovoltaics
which either reduces cost or improves efficiency would drastically alter
the traditional function of the utility. Therefore, significant competitive
interaction can be expected in the development of a PEPS technology.
PART I: UTILITY PRICING POLICIES
The economic feasibility of using solar energy generally depends on the
type of system considered. Although precise determinations on the com-
petitiveness of various systems are difficult due to the large number of
variables affecting the analysis, certain generalizations are useful. In the
opinion of most analysts, solar hot water heating is presently com-
petitive on a life cycle cost basis with conventional hot water heating
systems. 9 Life cycle costing considers the cost of the system over its
useful life. The competitiveness of solar space heating is more controver-
sial, the most optimistic view being that it is competitive with conven-
tional systems only in some locations.30 Solar air conditioning and
photovoltaics are generally viewed as offering the promise of being com-
petitive in the future.2
"BUSINESS WEEK. supra note 5, at 96.
28FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, BUREAU OF COMPETITION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYM-
POSIUM ON COMPETITION IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY: THE PARTICIPATION OF ELECTRIC
UTILITY COMPANIES IN THE SOLAR ENERGY INDUSTRY, 2 (National Economic Research
Associates, Inc. Publication N-20078) (Hereinafter cited as FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N).
"9Hirshberg, Public Policy for Solar Heating and Cooling, BULL. OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS,
Oct. 1976, at 39.
3 0FEDERAL TRADE COMMN., supra note 28, at 5.31Id.
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The application of present utility pricing methods creates an economic
barrier to the use of solar energy. The pricing of natural gas insulates the
consumer from the true costs of new supplies by averaging the price of
new gas supplies with the price of existing supply contracts.2 The same
principles of average costing apply in pricing electricity since the utility
costs for new fuel supplies are rolled into the price of older fuel supplies. 33
This pricing policy insulates the consumer from the actual incremental
cost of acquiring new supplies of natural gas and fuel. Solar energy is
placed at an economic disadvantage in trying to penetrate the heating
market since it must compete with energy forms which are priced at less
than their replacement cost to society. The adoption of a pricing policy
by the utilities which places less preeminence on historical costs would
not only improve the competitiveness of solar energy but would also pro-
vide an incentive to conserve fossil fuels.
When these average cost pricing methods are not a complete economic
barrier, 34 the solar user faces an economic trade-off in deciding on the ap-
propriate amount of storage capacity to be used in conjunction with the
solar system. A larger storage capacity provides greater independence
from the utility, but the investment cost is also greater. A larger storage
capacity also means that the total capacity of the system will be used less
frequently, and thus at times there will be excess capacity. Consequently,
most solar users are not likely to install storage capacity capable of satis-
fying their needs during the worst possible weather conditions since this
capability would require a disproportionately greater investment. The
solar user is more likely to solve this economic trade-off by installing a
reasonable amount of capacity and turning to the utility for
supplemental service when that capacity is expended. 35 The trade-off
which the solar user found too costly to meet by installing sufficient
capacity would appear to be solved by transferring the problem to the
utility.
"For a discussion of incremental versus rolled-in pricing of new gas supplies at the in-
terstate level, see Aman and Howard, Natural Gas and Electric Utility Rate Reform: Taxa-
tion Through Ratemaking? 28 HASTINGS L.J. 1085, 1126-44 (1977).
"
3STAFF OF SOLAR IMPLEMENTATION COMM.. CALIF. ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION &
DEVELOPMENT COMM'N. SOLAR ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA: RESIDENTIAL THERMAL APPLICA-
TIONS V-3 (Draft Report 1978).
"
4Several adopted policies will operate to improve the competitive position of solar
energy. Over half of the states have enacted tax incentive legislation to encourage the in-
stallation of solar equipment. For an analysis of the legislation see Minan and Lawrence,
State Tax Incentives to Promote the Use of Solar Energy, 56 TEx. L. REV. 835 (1978). A
federal tax credit was created through the Energy Tax Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-618, 92
Stat. 3174 (1978) (amending the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 with the creation of section
44C). The deregulation of new natural gas will cause the price of that fuel to rise, thus
enabling solar energy to better compete. Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978. Pub. L. No.
95-621, 92 Stat. 3351 (1978).
""Most solar heating and cooling applications to date provide between 70 and 80 per-
cent of the needed energy requirements, meaning the remaining 20 to 30 percent must be
provided from conventional backup sources." Bos, Solar Energy: Perspective and Pro-
spects, 38 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN POWER CONFERENCE 449 (1976).
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Economic problems can be created, though, for the utility in supplying
backup service to solar users.3 6 While most utility customers require
service during the entire year, the solar customers will require backup
service only when the capacity of their storage system has been
expended. Furthermore, the demand for backup service is likely to coin-
cide with peak demand periods. The annual peak load or peak demand
represents the maximum power requirement upon the utility,37 and
therefore determines the plant size necessary to meet that demand. Gas
distribution utilities frequently experience their annual peak load during
the coldest day of the year since this is the time when the demand for
heating service is likely to be the greatest. Some electric utilities also ex-
perience a winter annual peak load.38 The need for heating backup service,
although only intermittent, will occur during extended cold and cloudy
periods, which will coincide with heavy demands for heating from non-
solar customers. In order to satisfy the total demand for energy during
these peak periods, the utility must have adequate generating capacity.
However, since the backup demand is only intermittent, the utility might
be the one with an investment in excess capacity.
Demand costs are a crucial factor in ascertaining the impact of excess
capacity created in providing backup service to the solar user. These
costs "consist of all or most of the plant-related costs, such as return on
the rate base, principal taxes, the annual depreciation accrual and certain
expenses of operation and maintenance. ' 39 Put simply, they are plant
capacity costs which are determined by the size of the plant. Even if a
portion of the plant capacity is used only occasionally to meet peak de-
mand, full demand costs will still be incurred by the utility since they are
fixed costs unrelated to the level of output.40
Intermittent solar backup service will also lead to higher unit
generation costs when the demand is on-peak. Utilities satisfy their base
6For a comprehensive treatment of public utility economics, see J. BONBRIGHT. PRIN-
CIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY RATES (1961); P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY
ECONOMICS (1964); 1 A. KAHN. THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITU-
TIONS (1970); id. Vol 2 (1971); A. PRIEST. PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION (1969).31The peak load is a calculation of energy use over time. Peak loads are measured on
seasonal, monthly, weekly, daily, and hourly bases.3 8
"[Although the majority of utilities are summer peaking due to air conditioning loads,
there may be a future trend back toward winter peaking in many of these utilities due to
moratoriums on gas and oil hookups and price increases for those energy sources." THE
AEROSPACE CORPORATION, SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING OF BUILDINGS (SHACOB) RE-
QUIREMENTS DEFINITION AND IMPACT ANALYSIS 2 (Interim Report 1977). The significance of
the seasonal peak occurring in the summer or winter is discussed extensively in Lawrence
& Minan, supra note 8.
"9p. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 154 (1964).
40 The total fixed costs, other things equal, are independent of the volume of ser-
vice provided. That is, their total is a function of the size of total plant and
does not fluctuate in accord with variations in output from a plant of a given
size. This characteristic permits utilities other than telephone companies to





load requirements with their newer fossil fuel and nuclear plants. The
'unit costs are low, but considerable time is required to start them up and
bring them on line. As demand increases, the intermediate load con-
sisting of older, less efficient coal-fired plants are brought on line. Peak
load demand is usually met with plants fired by oil and natural gas. The
fuels to fire these plants is more expensive, leading to higher unit genera-
tion costs, but they can be brought on line much more quickly.41 Thus,
peak load requirements for backup service can involve substantial de-
mand costs and higher unit costs in the utility's operations.
By substantially increasing the price of its backup service, a utility
could'prevent the solar user from relying upon it for auxilliary power and
thereby drastically affect the economics of solar energy as a competitive
energy source. Utility decisions on pricing are regulated, however, by
state law and the decisions of state regulatory commissions. Utilities are
permitted to operate as monopolies in order to achieve the economic
efficiencies associated with "natural monopolies." 42 The advantages of
this form of market structure are preserved for the public through
regulation of the prices charged and the services provided by the
utilities.43 State statutes allow public utilities to charge only reasonable
rates which do not unduly discriminate or give preferential treatment.
4
Although regulated, a utility is nevertheless entitled to the oppor-
tunity to earn a reasonable rate of return on the properties dedicated to
serve the public, in addition to recovery of its proper operating expenses,
taxes, and depreciation.4 5 The regulatory imposition of a rate that is not
reasonable would constitute confiscation of property in violation of the
Constitution.46 This constitutional limitation thus creates a legitimate
4'MITRE CORP.. ENERGY RATE INIATIVES: STUDY OF THE INTERFACE BETWEEN SOLAR AND
WIND ENERGY SYSTEMS AND ELECTRIC UTILITIES 41 (1977).
42For an explanation of the characteristics of natural monopolies see infra notes 124-141
and accompanying text.
"The regulatory process is described very well in Jones, Judicial Detennination of Public
Utility Rates: A Critique, 54 BOSTON U.L. REV. 873 (1974); Jones, An Example of a
Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM.
L. REV. 462 (1973).
"The discriminatory standard is discussed in Aman & Howard, supra note 32, at
1101-06, and Kadane, The Legality of Marginal Pricing for Utility Services, 5 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 755, 755-60 (1977).
41The revenue requirement can be stated in formula form as follows: RR = OM + D + T
+ (G - AD) R, where:
RR = revenue requirement
OM operation and maintenance
D = annual depreciation
T = taxes
G = gross value of the property
AD = accrued (or sometimes observed) depreciation of the property
R = rate of return (a percentage)
(G-AD) = rate base
EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE. ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE FUTURE 259 (1976).
"The Supreme Court reiterated the constitutional principle in several of its major opi-
nions concerning regulatory rate-making. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466,526 (1898) (forbid-
den to have rates "so unreasonably low as to deprive the carrier of its property without
1979]
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claim for increased total compensation to the extent that a utility can
demonstrate that increased costs are imposed in providing this service.
And, as has been demonstrated, the provision of backup service during
on-peak hours can result in substantial increased demand costs.
Public utility rates have traditionally been based on cost of service
principles. The total expenses of the utility are first allocated to customer
classifications, such as residential, commerical and industrial classes.
47
Rate schedules designed to recover all costs allocated to each class are
prepared by the utility, subject to regulatory scrutiny, and are used to
determine the exact charges to each customer within the class. 48 Three
cost categories are recognized in this pricing procedure. The costs of
metering and billing each customer are borne equally by all customers in
a class and are known as customer costs.49 Energy costs 0 are the ex-
penses incurred by an electric utility to purchase fuel for use in the
generation of power.51 Each customer's proportion of these costs is deter-
mined by the amount of energy the customer consumes. Demand costs52
are the third and last component, and they are allocated to each customer
class through the use of various formulas. 53
Application of cost of service principles to solar backup service would
result in high rates for such service. The service could be separated from
existing customer classifications since it is distinguishable on the basis
that medical treatment consented to by said patient would be terminated
in such an event. This document would be notarized and attested to by at
such compensation as the Constitution secures"); Bluefield Water Works & Improvement
Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 679, 694 (1923) ("utility is protected against being com-
pelled to serve for confiscatory rates"); McCardle v. Indianapolis Water Co., 272 U.S. 400
(1926)(schedule of rates prescribed by state commission for a water company enjoined as
confiscatory).
47p. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra note 39, at 135-36.
"For a discussion of rate structures and proposed reforms see Note, Lexonomics and the
Electrical Utility Industry: In Search of the Optimal Rate Structure, 61 IOWA L. REV. 134
(1975).
4Customer costs "include the expenses of meter reading, billing, collecting and
accounting, and the costs associated with such company property as metering equipment
and service connections." P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY. supra note 39, at 154.
"OGas distribution utilities refer to these costs as commodity costs.
"Energy costs "include for the most part, the expenses for fuel, fuel handling, and part
of power plant operating and maintenance expenses." P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY. supra
note 39, at 154.
"Demand costs "consist of all or most of the plant-related costs, such as return on the
rate base, principal taxes, the annual decpreciation accural and certain expenses of opera-
tion and maintenance." Id
"The Peak Responsibility Method:
Allocates demand costs among customer classes in proportion to the respec-
tive class loads at the annual peak demand on the system. The underlying
hypothesis of this method is that the size of plant is determined by the annual
peak, which is built up by those customer classes requiring service at that
time. Accordingly, the demand costs associated with that maximum annual
load are allocated among the classes in proportion to their contribution to




of such factors as the purpose to which the service is applied, the inter-
mittent nature of the demand and the consequent effect on utility
demand costs. Under the demand cost allocation formulas, a large pro-
portion of the total demand costs would then be allocated to the backup
service customer class. The allocation formulas vary in whether they
emphasize class peak demands or system peaks, 54 but backup heating
service is likely to involve both. Coincidence with these peaks would
result in major allocations of demand costs and correspondingly high
rates for backup service. Consequently, the solar user may be required to
pay for the economic burden transferred to the utilities.
The regulatory commissions might decide for policy reasons to deviate
from cost of service principles in the pricing of solar backup service. This
approach could be based on a decision to encourage further development
of solar energy, and could be accomplished by refusing to allow the util-
ities to classify solar backup service as a separate customer group or by
requiring special promotional rates for such services. Some states have
already passed legislation which forbids increased rates for solar
backup.5 The adoption of this policy approach, however, is tantamount
to subsidization of solar users. If the increased costs imposed on utilities
to provide backup service can not be charged to solar users, they will
inevitably be charged to other customers.
By combining heat storage technology with time of day pricing,
backup service could be economically provided by the utilities and sub-
sidization of solar users could be avoided. Stored heating systems are
P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra note 39, at 160-61.
Another major method is the Non-Coincident Demand Method.
The theoretical basis of this method provides that the joint-demand costs in-
curred in serving a number of customer groups should be allocated in propor-
tion to the facilities necessary to serve each customer group separately.
Accordingly, this method looks to class peak demand, regardless of the time
of occurence. These steps are required: (a) the peak demands of each class,
regardless of time of occurrence, are added to find the sum of the maximum
class demands; and (b) the allocation of system demand costs to each class is
calculated on the basis of the ratio of each class peak to the sum of the max-
imum demands.
Id.
The Average-and-Excess-Demand Method "allocates the cost of capacity required to
meet the average load on the basis of average customer demands and apportions the cost
of excess facilities necessary to meet the system peak demand on the basis of non-
coincident customer peaks." Jones, supra note 43, at 889 n. 66.
For an economic analysis of the demand allocation formulas see Huntington, The Rapid
Emergence of Marginal Cost Pricing in the Regulation of Electric Utility Rate Structures,
55 BOSTON U.L. REV. 689, 710-11 (1975).51The Peak Responsibility Method "considers demand and time of use only at the time of
the system peak; it does not take into account the quantity of energy consumed."
The Non-Coincident Demand Method "recognizes as important only the peak demand of
each class, but not the amount or time of use. Thus, a class whose peak occurred at the
time of the system peak would be allocated the same proportion of demand costs as
another class of equal peak demand occurring clearly off peak." P. GARFIELD & W. LOVE-
JOY. supra note 39, at 160-61.
5 See, e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §156 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78).
1979l
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
already in use in several New England areas.5 6 A transfer fluid or
ceramics are heated electrically during non-peak hours in the early
morning and late evening. This stored heat is then available for use the
next day. Similarly, the fluid in the storage tank of a solar system could
be heated during off-peak hours on those days when the solar energy is in-
adequate to assure a sufficient level of stored capacity. Some utilities
have already adopted special rates for service provided only during off-
peak hours.5 7 Since this off-peak service is less expensive for the utility to
provide, the rates for such service have been significantly lower than
rates for conventional service.5 8
The off-peak service is more economical for the utility to provide
because it does not coincide with the utility's daily peak.5 9 When service
demand can be diversified by spreading it out during the day rather than
having it overlap during relatively short periods, the utility can use its
generation facilities more efficiently. A smaller plant capacity is possible
whenever the peak demands of different classes do not have to be
satisfied simultaneously. Hence, a very realistic way for utilities to try to
avoid higher total demand costs is to encourage daily diversity in energy
demands.
Although utilities in the past have vigorously promoted their various
energy forms in order to increase total sales, greater emphasis is today
being placed on diversification of customer demand. This heightened in-
terest in diversity has been prompted largely by the effects of inflation on
capital construction costs,6 0 delays and frustrations in obtaining
56 Faced with revdhue deficiencies, worsening load factors, and the recognition
that baseboard heating is typically over 75 percent system peak coincident,
and that heat pumps use less kilowatt-hours annually yet require the same
capacity as baseboard electric heating systems, [utility and regulatory com-
missions] see storage heating as the next logical development of electric
heating as the country moves to adopt ... time-based rates. Storage heating
has now gone beyond the testing phase and is being marketed in competition
with direct electric heating and oil and gas heating systems.
deGrasse, Electric Storage Heating after Two Years, PUB. UTIL. FORT.. January 6, 1977, at
23.57In 1974 the Vermont Public Service Board approved an optional seventeen-hour rate
for the Central Vermont Public Service Corporation. Id. at 29.
Proposals and commission action for time of day rates have occurred in a number of
states. E.g., California (San Diego Gas & Electric Co. filed Jan. 20, 1978); Connecticut (Con-
necticut Light & Power experiment beginning October 1975); Illinois (Illinois Power Co.
filed July 23, 1976, in Docket No. 760435); Kansas (Kansas Gas & Electric Co. filed Sept.
10, 1976, Docket No. 109227-U); Virginia (Virginia Electric & Power Co., Docket No.
7864675).
58The demand charge for peak-hour usage under the Central Vermont Public Service Cor-
poration option rate (see deGrasse, supra note 56, at 29) is more than eight and one-half
times the demand charge for off-peak hours. IM Projected ratios have been indicated at 3
to 1 or 4 to 1, or even higher if the peak-load period is narrowly defined in terms of hours.
Morrisey, The Changing Structure of Utility Rates, 97 PUB. UTIL. FORT. June 17, 1976, at
17-18.5
"lilt is on-peak usage which requires the incurrence of the largest part of the electric
utility's costs." Jones, supra note 43, at 496.
60 There is no mystery about the utility industry's problems. The group is facing
strong demands to expand at a time when both money costs and construction
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regulatory approval for the siting of nuclear and conventional power
plants,6 1 and the evolution of a national policy promoting energy conser-
vation.62 Thus, utilities have increasingly directed attention to various
load management techniques designed to reduce the maximum power
demand on a utility. These techniques include, for example, ripple or
radio control mechanisms or other types of interruptible service, energy
storage devices, and load limiting devices. 63 Time of day pricing for
backup service represents a means to induce customers to use such ser-
vice only during off-peak hours in order to take advantage of the lower
rates. Time of day pricing would provide an effective means of securing
load management controls in addition to providing the solar user with an
economical rate for backup service.
The utilities are in a position to stifle solar competition through the
rate charged for solar backup service. The economic trade-off which the
solar user finds too costly to meet by installing sufficient capacity to
satisfy demand during the worst possible weather conditions has not
been solved, it has merely been transferred to the utility. Since the
demand for this service will occur during peak periods, thus making it
some of the most expensive offered by a utility, the cost of providing it
can be prohibitive. Ideally, the rate charged by the utility for backup ser-
vice should be compensatory so as to avoid subsidization of solar users
by other utility customers, while not ,imposing an economic penalty
which discourages solar use. By combining heat storage technology with
time of day pricing, the seemingly conflicting interests of the utility and
the solar user can be reconciled, and the stifling of solar competition
through the solar backup rate avoided.
PART II: MULTI-USER SOLAR SYSTEMS
Solar systems can be used to produce energy for apartment buildings,
condominiums, shopping centers, industrial parks, or any similar
activity where multiple users could utilize a single system. A shared solar
costs are soaring. The rising costs have put their profits under pressure, and
higher fuel bills have intensified their profit problems. Meanwhile, the
utilities' long-term growth prospects are uncertain on two counts; namely,
their fuel supplies no longer seem assured, and consumers may reduce their
use of electricity as monthly bills continue to mount.
Fredman & Sharma, The Performance of Electric and Natural Gas Utility Equities, 102
PUB. UTIL. FORT.. October 12, 1978, at 27.
"Baram, Radiation from Nuclear Power Plants: The Need for Congressional Directives,
14 HARV. J. LEGIS. 905 (1977); Luce, Power for Tomorrow: The Siting Dilemma, 1 ENVT'L L.
60 (1970); Palfrey, Energy and the Environment: The Special Case for Nuclear Power, 74
COLUM L. REV. 1375 (1974); Nuclear Power Symposium, 6 ENVT*L L. 621 (1976).
62National Energy Conservation Policy Act, Act of Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92
Stat. 3207 (1978).
63For a description of these devices see Miller & Gerber, The Technology For Load
Management Rate Structures, 97 PUB. UTIL. FORT. June 3, 1976, at 41-44. Additional in-
formation concerning costs of load management devices and types of meters is provid-




system is capable of producing substantial cost savings. No matter
where it is located within the area serviced by a utility, a multi-user solar
system would compete with the utility. As a result of the National
Energy Conservation Policy Act, 64 which prohibits a public utility from
supplying or installing residential solar energy devices used for hot water
heating or space heating or cooling,65 a utility will likely be more sensitive
to such competition. The response of the utilities and their regulators to
this competitive interaction will determine the extent of any significant
barriers to the utilization of multi-user solar systems.
Most utilities are presently confronted by a steadily increasing demand
for power and by the accompanying difficulty of determining the
appropriate means of generating that additional power.6 6 In addition,
they face a growing series of procedural difficulties in securing author-
ization from the various regulatory authorities to proceed with their deci-
sion to provide increased generation capacity. 67 Even when approval is
secured, vast sums are required to finance actual implementation.
To the extent shared solar systems do not significantly interfere with
or adversely affect their operations, utilities may have a tolerant attitude
toward them. And, of course, a utility may have a permissive attitude
toward multi-user solar systems if they alleviate its capital requirements
by delaying or eliminating the need to build or finance new facilities. This
situation might exist, for example, with a summer peaking utility since
the solar systems would tend to reduce the seasonal peak demand.68 Since
utilities are entitled to earn a rate of return on legitimate capital in-
vestments, a permissive attitude based on reducing the capital needs of
6 4National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Act of Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-619, 92 Stat. 3207 (1978).
6511. at § 216(a)(1); § 210(11)(H).
6 FEDERAL TRADE COMM'N supra note 28, at 4.
67Approximately one-third of the states have power plant siting statutes which
regulate the location of power plant facilities. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§§4906.01-.99 (Page 1977). Typically, the review process provides the opportunity for
public participation and includes considerations on environmental effects, compatibility
with land use plans, technical feasibility, and other factors. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. §§16-50g to z (West Cum. Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§403.501-.517 (West Cum.
Supp. 1978); N.D. CENT. CODE §§49-22-01 to 23 (1978). See generally, Best, Recent
State Initiatives on Power Plant Siting: A Report and Comment 5 NAT. RESOURCE LAW.
668 (1972); Journey, Power Plant Siting - A Road Map of the Problem, 48 NOTRE DAME
L. 273 (1972); Stone, Power Siting: A Challenge to the Legal Process, 36 ALB. L. REv. 1
(1971); Tarlock, Tippy & Francis, Environmental Regulation of Power Plant Siting: Ex-
isting and Proposed Institutions, 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 502 (1972); Willrich, The Energy-
Environment Conflict: Siting Electric Power Facilities, 58 VA. L. REV. 257 (1972); Com-
ment, Power Plant and Transmission Line Siting: Improving Arizona's Legislative Ap-
proach, 1973 LAW AND THE SOC. ORD. 518; Note, Power and the Environment" A Statutory
Approach to Electric Facility Siting, 47 Wash. L. Rev. 35 (1971). These statutes are
not likely to present a significant obstacle to multi-user systems. However, one should
be alert to the possibility that shared systems may involve extensive land use preemp-
tion and may also cause local thermal pollution and disrupt atmospheric circulation pat-
terns. See J. HOLDREN & P. HERRERA. ENERGY: A CRISIS IN POWER 115 (1971).
68Lawrence & Minan, supra note 8.
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by their use will be affected by whether the "idled" capacity can be as
economically deployed by the utility elsewhere through load
management or other techniques. As long as the excess capacity can be
effectively used to meet other loads or demands, the multi-user solar
system is likely to be viewed as complementary to utility operations and
not competitive.
A negative attitude may exist toward multi-user solar systems when
the utility is left with excess capacity which can not be as economically
deployed or when capacity must be expanded to meet solar backup
demand. The utility may be required to increase capacity because, for ex-
ample, the multi-user's need for backup service coincides with seasonal
peak demand periods. Under either of these circumstances the utility
.faces decreased revenues without any corresponding cost benefit. Predic-
tably, the utility will want to continue earning a return on the
undepreciated portion of its investment in the "idled" or expanded
facilities. The economic burden occasioned by either of these situations
may be borne by the utility's non-solar customers, but this result would
have to be achieved through a rate increase necessitating a change in the
rate structure. Allocating the burden to the non-solar user would effec-
tively subsidize the solar user at the expense of the non-solar user. A
public utility commission or other regulatory agency may be reluctant to
permit this form of subsidization out of a sense of equity or for other
reasons. Moreover, the utility may be hesitant in seeking to use the rate
structure to accomplish this purpose because of increasing customer
hostility to rate increases. Thus, placing the added economic burden on
non-solar utility customers may not be feasible.
As discussed in Part I, the rate structure for providing backup service
to the solar user may be the mechanism for allocating the economic
burden associated with the "idled" or expanded facilities. 69 Since multi-
user systems may receive backup service from the utility the same
principles apply. Arguably, a utility may not be as reluctant to use the
rate structure for placing the burden on the solar user class since it
created the economic disadvantage. Statutory limitations may, however,
limit the utility in doing this.71 Therefore, less politically sensitive or
legally objectionable alternatives may be sought by a utility. One such
alternative may involve the regulatory process.
A public utility operates in a natural monopoly market, and is
generally spared from competition by government protection. Regulation
has been the principal response to natural monopoly conditions.71 For the
69Supra notes 36 through 63 and accompanying text.
'OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 156 (West Cum. Supp. 1977-78), specifically provides:
"No public utility shall increase rates charged or enforce a surcharge on the basis of
the use or installation of a solar energy device by a consumer."
71The debate has raged long and hard over the merits of utility regulation. See
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548 (1969); Comanor,
Should Natural Monopolies be Regulated? 22 STAN.'L. REV. 510 (1970); Swidler, Com-
ments on the Case for Deregulation, 22 STAN. L. REv. 519 (1970); Shepherd, Regulation
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most part, it is a state agency process conducted through a public utility
commission (PUC) or similar regulatory entity. PUC jurisdiction and
authority over shared solar systems will depend on the interpretation of
state statutes and will vary between states. 2
A utility may be required to obtain one or more franchises from the
state or local governmental bodies located within the area it desires to
serve." Typically, franchises grant the utility the right to provide its ser-
vices for profit on an exclusive or nearly exclusive basis within a
designated area. 74 The terms of the franchise protect the utility from com-
petitive encroachment.
Territorial protection by franchise has been superseded in practical
importance, however, by the requirement that a certificate of public
convenience and necessity be obtained from the PUC prior to the con-
struction and operation of any new generation or transmission capacity. 75
As a practical matter, the monopoly status of a public utility is
established and maintained by the refusal of a PUC to authorize competi-
tion in a utility service area. This practical effect holds true regardless of
the exact provisions of the certificates issued. Even though many states
do not issue certificates that confer monopoly rights upon the certificate
holders, a PUC may still refuse to authorize competition by the multi-
user system unless the public convenience and necessity requires it. 76 The
certificate proceeding is an administrative matter for a PUC and cer-
tification is the foundation of the regulated monopoly principle under
which most public utilities are protected and allowed to operate.
When the existing service is inadequate or when a new type of service
is required, a PUC may permit competition. Ordinarily, while certificate
proceedings inquire into the ability of an applicant to provide efficient
and adequate service, they also determine the public need for the
proposed service. The proceedings involve determinations as to the finan-
cial, engineering, and economic feasibility of the proposed project. They
also examine whether another utility is already providing adequate
service, and whether sufficient potential customers exist to make the
enterprise a viable one. 77 When the certificate application is based on
deficiencies in existing service, many PUCs allow the incumbent utility a
and its Alternatives, 22 STAN. L. REV. 529 (1970); Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its
Regulation: A Reply, 22 STAN. L. REV. 540 (1970); Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? 11
J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968).
71Dean & Miller, Utilities at the Dawn of a Solar Age, 53 N.D. L. REV. 329, 346 (1977)."
13PROGRAM OF POLICY STUDIES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. GEO. WASH. U. (WASHINGTON,
D.C.), LEGAL-INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF WIND ENERGY CONVERSION SYSTEMS (WECS) 115
(Report No. NSF/RA-770203 to the National Science Foundation under NSF Grant No.
APR75-19137, 1977).
74
M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON. PUBLIC UTILITIES: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT. AND OWNERSHIP 62
(1973).
7"P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra note 39, at 28-30.
71IL at 29.
I'D. TURNER, TRENDS AND TOPICS IN UTILITY REGULATION 42 (1969).
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period of grace within which to effectuate reforms, unless it appears that
any such effort would be futile. 78 As a general rule, most PUCs prefer the
incumbent utility over the new entrant when the applicant proposes ob-
taining a certificate to serve a need not presently being satisfied by an ex-
isting utility. 9
Whether the state certification process is an obstacle to the operation
of multi-user solar systems principally depends on whether the solar
activity is subject to PUC jurisdiction. Public utility status would entail
the duty to obtain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before
operating.8 0 Since additional regulatory burdens also accompany public
utility status, the owners of a multi-user solar system are likely to want
to avoid it.81 Public utilities hostile to the development of multi-user solar
systems,. on the other hand, are likely to favor subjecting them to PUC
jurisdication and regulation.
The form of energy supplied by the multi-user solar system may be con-
trolling in determining PUC jurisdiction. Shared solar systems may be
used to generate electricity, chemical energy, or thermal energy which
may be in the form of steam or hot water. Some states do not grant
jurisdiction over the production and sale of steam to the public utility
commission. 2 Generally, thermal energy is not regulated because the
statutes fail to mention it.83 While electric utilities are uniformly
regulated by public utility commissions, regulation of utilities supplying
heating or cooling is not nearly as pervasive.8 4 Therefore, under existing
state statutes multi-user electric solar systems are more likely to be sub-
ject to PUC jurisdiction than are multi-user heating or cooling systems.
78See, e.g., Chicago & W. T. Rys. v. Illinois Comm. Comm'n 381 Ill. 20, 48 N.E.2d
320 (1943); North Car. Util. Comm'n v. Queen City Coach Co., 233 N.C. 119, 63
S.E.2d 113 (1950). But, cf. Greyhound Corp. v. Carter, 124 So.2d 9, 17 (Fla. Sup. Ct.
1960).
7'See, e.g., Fulton Water Co., 59 P.U.R.3d 100 (Cal. P.U.C. 1965); Citizen's Valley
View Co. v. Illinois Comm. Comm'n, 28 Ill.2d 294, 192 N.E.2d 392, 51 P.U.R.3d 89
(1963); Capital Elec. Power Ass'n v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 240 Miss. 139,
125 So.2d 739, 37 P.U.R.3d 246 (1961); Painter v. Public Util Comm'n, 194 Pa.
Super. 548, 169 A.2d 113, 38 P.U.R.3d 302 (1961).
'
0See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-4-25(1) (Supp. 1971) which provides: "No ... electric
corporation.., shall henceforth establish, or begin construction or operation of a plant or
system, without having first obtained from the commission a certificate that present or
future public convenience and necessity does or will require such construction."
81 If a shared solar system is found to be a public utility, it must file reports and
accounts, serve all customers who demand service within a given area, submit
its rate schedules to the PUC for approval, continue providing service until
given permission to discontinue, provide safe and adequate service, and com-
ply with limitations on the issuance of securities.
Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 348.
"See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 366.02 (1968). But see, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66 § 1102(17)(a) and
(b) (1959): "A public utility is defined as: ... persons or corporations owning or operating
facilities for (a) Producing, generating, transmitting, distributing... natural or artificial
gas, electricity, or steam... to or for public compensation."
"'Contra, Wis. STAT. ANN. § 196.01 (1957), as amended, (Supp. 1976); ILL. REV. STAT. Ch.
111 2/3, § 10.3 (Smith-Hurd 1966), as amended, (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977).
"Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 346.
1979]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
In many states the term "public utility" is construed to require that
the entity hold itself out as ready and willing to serve an indefinite
public.8 5 The concept of dedication to the public use is normally
controlling, and is usually evidenced by some act which is reasonably in-
terpreted and relied on by the public as an indication of a willingness to
provide service on equal terms to all who might apply.86 In addition to
this requirement, a state may also require a sale before the activity ob-
tains public utility status.8 7 In other states, activities not involving a ser-
vice to the public have nevertheless been found to be so impregnated with
the public interest that regulation as a public utility was warranted.88 An
activity not involving a dedication to the public use may be judicially
declared to be so affected with a public interest that PUC jurisdiction is
justified. 9 Public utility status also may depend on either the number of
persons serviced or the amount of power produced. One state provides,
for example, "no person shall be deemed to be a public utility if it
presently produces or furnishes service to less than 25 persons."9
Varying legislative and judicial responses exist, however, when a lessor
supplies utility service to a lessee.91 For example, a Utah shopping center
"
5See, e.g., Claypool v. Lightning Delivery Co., 38 Ariz. 262, 299 P. 126 (1931); Story v.
Richardson, 186 Cal. 162, 198 P. 1057 (1921); Sutton v. Hunziker, 75 Idaho 395, 272 P.2d
1012 (1954); Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co. v. Ames, 359 Ill. 132, 134 N.E. 260 (1935);
Missouri v. Brown, 323 Mo. 818, 19 N.W.2d 1048 (1929); Bricker v. Industrial Gas Co., 58
Ohio App. 101, 16 N.E.2d 218 (1937); Limestone Rural Tel. Co. v. Best, 56 Okla. 85, 155 P.
901 (1916); Schumacher v. Railroad Comm'n., 185 Wis. 303, 201 N.W. 241 (1924); Cawkes v.
Meyer, 147 Wis. 320, 113 N.W. 157 (1911); Re Nafe, 4 P.U.R.3d 369 (Ohio Pub. Util.
Comm'n 1953). See generally, Priest, Some Bases of Public Utility Regulation, 36 Miss.
L.J. 18 (1965).
86Priest, supra note 85, at 24.
"
7See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216(a) and (b) (West 1975); PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. ch. 111
213 § 10.3(c) (1975); N.Y. PUB. SERVICE LAW § 5.1.b (McKinney 1977). Cf Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117, Nov. 9, 1978; 16 U.S.C. 2601
§ 3(4): "The term 'electric utility' means any person, State agency, or Federal agency,
which sells (emphasis added) electric energy." National Energy Conservation Policy Act of
1978, § 210(f): "The term 'public utility' means any person, State agency, or Federal agen-
cy which is engaged in the business of selling natural gas or electric energy, or both, to
residential customers for use in a residential building."
8 Public Serv. Comm'n v. Panhandle E. Pipeline Co., 224 Ind. 662, 71 N.E.2d 117,
afrd,332 U.S. 507 (1947). The Indiana Supreme Court found the gas company's sales to
large industrial users so closely related to the public interest that regulation was merited.
In Industrial Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 135 Ohio St. 408, 410, 21 N.E.2d 166, 168
(1939), the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
Regardless of the right of the public to demand and receive service.., a cor-
poration that serves such a substantial part of the public as to make its rates,
charges, and methods of operation a matter of public concern, welfare and in-
terest subjects itself to regulation by the duly constituted government
authority....
Later Ohio decisions dealing with the definition of "public utility" require a showing of a
"readiness to serve an indefinite public." Ohio Power Co. v. Attica, 19 Ohio App.2d 89,
97-98, 250 N.E.2d 111, 117 (1969).
89WECS, supra note 73, at 112.
90MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216 B.02(4) (West Supp. 1977). See also ALASKA STAT. §
42.05.701(5)(A) (1962).
9
'See, e.g., Sun Prarie v. PSC/Wisconsin, 37 Wisc.2d 96, 154 N.W.2d 360 (1967) (landlord
furnishing power to tenants is not a public utility. "Public" is construed to mean more
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owner was not allowed to generate and distribute electrical power to its
tenants, who were all retail business outlets in the shopping center,
without being regulated as a utility.2 The generating facilities were
located on contiguous private property owned by the shopping center,
and the service was to be supplied only to its tenants. The Tenth Circuit
held that the shopping center had no right to sell electricity since it
lacked the necessary certificate of public convenience and necessity. In
contrast, some states specifically exempt lessors from utility
regulation.13 A Minnesota statute, for example, provides that no entity
shall be deemed to be a public utility if it furnishes services only to
tenants in buildings owned, leased, or operated by it.94 Furthermore,
some PUCs have rejected jurisdiction when the cost of the service is in-
cluded in the rent on the basis that the service is not affected with a
public interest.95 However, metering and charging each lessee for the elec-
trical service, as distinguished from including it in the rent, may result in
PUC jurisdiction.9 6
Public utilities have been traditionally required to provide a certain
quality of service to their customers.97 If the multi-user solar system falls
within PUC jurisdiction, the discontinuous nature of the power it pro-
vides may give an independent justification for denial of certification. If,
however, the multi-user system effectively provides continuous service
through the use of storage capabilities or a conventional backup source,
the discontinuous nature of the solar power itself may not be deter-
minative.
Recent federal legislation has removed some of the present discretion
from the state regulatory authorities. The Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978 permits the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
to prescribe rules relating to the exemption of "qualifying cogeneration
facilities" from state laws and regulatioii respecting electric utility
regulation.9 8 The term cogeneration facility is defined as a "facility which
than the relation between landlord and tenant or the nearness of location of neighbors);
Dreselbrook Assoc. v. Penn P.U.C., 418 Pa. 430, 212 A.2d 237 (1965) (service for tenants of
apartment village is not service to the public so supplier is not a public utility); General
Split Corp. v. P &V Atlas Indus. Center, Inc., 44 P.U.R.3d 334 (1962) (landlord serving and
submetering only his tenants is not a public utility); State v. Public Serv. Comm. of Mo.,
178 S.W.2d 788 (1944) (those selling electricity to themselves and tenants in their building
are not a public utility); Jones v. Sweetland Co., 162 N.E. 45 (1928) (realty company fur-
nishing electricity to tenants but not selling to public utility).
"Cottonwood Mall Shopping Cent., Inc. v. Utah Power and Light Co., 440 F.2d 36 (10th
Cir. 1971).
"See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216 B.02(4) (West Supp. 1977).
"MINN. STAT. ANN. § 216 B.02(4) (West Supp. 1977). See also, PA. STAT. ANN. 66 § 1102(17)
(1978 Supp.).
"See General Split Corp. v. P. and V. Atlas Industrial Center, Inc., 44 P.U.R.3d 334
(Wisc. Public Service Comm. 1962).
"See, e.g., Turner, supra note 77, at 705-06.
"See generally, Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to RenderAdequate Service: Its Scope
and Enforcemen. 62 COLUM. L. REv. 312, 314-22 (1962).
"Act of Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978) at § 210(e) provides:
(c) Exemptions. (1) Not later than 1 year after the date of enactment of this
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produces (i) electric energy, and (ii) steam or forms of useful energy (such
'as heat) which are used for industrial, commerical, heating, or cooling
purposes.'"9 A facility owned by a person not primarily engaged in the
generation or sale of electric power and determined by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission to meet certain requirements respecting
minimum size, fuel use, and fuel efficiency, is defined as a qualifying
cogeneration facility. 100 In most instances the promulgation of rules by
the Commission should exempt multi-user solar systems from PUC
jurisdiction.
The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act represents an effort to
adopt a comprehensive set of national policies, and by doing so changes
the states' role in determining energy policy. Given the disparity
between states as to the type of activity having public utility status, the
establishment of a unified scheme for the amount of power which can be
produced without being subject to state regulation is desirable and
should facilitate the utilization of shared solar systems. Furthermore,
multi-user activities which are limited in scope and do not evidence an in-
tent to serve all comers may not be subject to PUC jurisdiction in some
states. Desires on the part of public utilities to resist the development of
multi-user solar systems through the regulatory certification process are
thus unlikely to be realized. This assessment does not mean, however,
that a utility has lost the potential to limit or control multi-user competi-
tion within its service area.
The owners of multi-user solar systems may wish to interconnect with
the local utility for supplemental power, and this desire may provide a
utility with an alternative mechanism for exercising some control over
their operation. Although a utility is under a general duty to supply all
Act and from time to time thereafter, the Commission shall, after consulta-
tion with representatives of State regulatory authorities, electric utilities,
owners of cogeneration facilities and owners of small power production
facilities, and after public notice and a reasonable opportunity for interested
persons (including State and Federal agencies) to submit oral as well as writ-
ten data, views, and arguments, prescribe rules under which qualifying
cogeneration facilities and qualifying small power production facilities are ex-
empted in whole or part from the Federal Power Act, from the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, from State laws and regulations respecting the rates,
or respecting the financial or organizational regulation, of electric utilities, or
from any combination of the foregoing, if the Commission determines such ex-
emption is necessary to encourage cogeneration and small power production.
(2) No qualifying small power production facility which has a power produc-
tion capacity which, together with any other facilities located at the same site
(as determined by the Commission), exceeds 30 megawatts may be exempted
under rules under paragraph (1) from any provision of law or regulation
referred to in paragraph (1), except that any qualifying small power produc-
tion facility which produces electric energy solely by the use of biomass as a
primary energy source, may be exempted by the Commission under such rules
from the Public Utility Holding Company Act and from State laws and




those within its service area, this general principle is subject to a number
of exceptions. If a customer sells the service to others,10' or violates
utility rules or regulations, or permits those who are not customers of the
utility to use its service, the utility's duty to provide service may be
negated.102 In order to prevent service contracts or utility regulations
from being used to impose unreasonably restrictive terms and conditions
on the owners of multi-user systems, uniform state or federal laws
anticipating this problem are desirable.
0 3
Allowing a utility to control the standards under which the inter-
connection can be made is another problem area since such standards
may effectively limit competitive entry. This problem was recognized, for
example, in Radiant Burners, Inc. v. Peoples Gas Light and Coke Co.10 4
Radiant Burners manufactured a new and arguably improved gas burner
but was refused the seal of approval of the American Gas Association.
This action by the Association practically destroyed the market for the
burner since gas distributors refused to connect their facilities to fur-
naces lacking the seal of approval. Multi-user systems could face similar
difficulties. Any procedure for setting standards that contemplates a
controlling or substantial voice for a utility has the potential for com-
petitive abuse.'05 But advantages also accompany allowing limited utility
"'See, e.g., City of High Point v. Duke Power Co., 34 F. Supp. 339 (M.D. N.C. 1940);
Lewis v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 62 App. D.C. 63, 64 F.2d 701 (1933).
"'°See Note, The Duty of a Public Utility to RenderAdequate Service: Its Scope and En-
forcement 62 COLUM. L. REV. 312 (1962). See also, Toledo Edison Co. Rules and Regula-
tions Regarding Customers' Wiring and Installations, filed pursuant to Order No.
71-148-Y of the P.U.C. of Ohio, dated January 31, 1973, § (1) which provides: "The Com-
pany shall have the right to refuse to connect any wiring or installation which does not
fully meet these requirements, regulations and rules, also the right to disconnect the
wiring or installation of any customer violating any such requirements, regulations or
rules...."
"'Congress took a preliminary step in this direction with the adoption of the following-
Upon application of any... qualifying cogenerator, or qualifying small
power producer, the Commission may issue an order requiring-
(A) the physical connection of any cogeneration facility, any small power
production facility, or the transmission facilities of any electric utility, with
the facilities of such applicant,
(B) such action as may be necessary to make effective any physical connec-
tion described in subparagraph (A), which physical connection is ineffective
for any reason, such as inadequate size, poor maintenance, or physical
unreliability,
(C) such sale or exchange of electric energy or other coordination, as may
be necessary to carry out the purposes of any order under subparagraph (A)
or (B), or
(D) such increase in transmission capacity as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of any order under subparagraph (A) or (B)." 92 Stat. 311, §
202.
104364 U.S. 656 (1961).
"'CQf American Medical Ass'n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943); Levin v. Doctors
Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 953 (D.D.C. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 354 F.2d 515 (D.C. Cir.
1965); Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 232 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968); Alabama
Optometric Ass'n v. Alabama St. Bd. of Health, 379 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Ala. 1974) (which
are cases dealing with this problem in a medical certification context.).
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participation in standard setting. A utility has a specialized
technological expertise which can be brought to bear on the complexities
accompanying both the operation of the multi-user system and its inter-
connection with existing utilities. In addition, utility personnel are
familiar with the specific heating and cooling requirements of customers
within their service area. The harmonious integration of shared systems
into utility operations is more likely if the utility is involved to some ex-
tent in standard setting. Further, the utility may have an incentive to in-
sure that multi-user systems perform efficiently and reliably in order to
minimize unplanned additions to peak demand. In sum, utilities will need
to have a comprehensive understanding of multi-user systems in order to
plan for adequate service, since both the type of installation and its
reliability can have important effects on the utility's costs and capacity
requirements. However, serious consideration must be given to the
potential competitive dangers which would result from the control of
shared solar systems by rules and regulations formulated by utility
policy.
Depending on state law, multi-user solar systems may be subject to
PUC jurisdiction and utility certification. The requirement that the
owners of a multi-user system obtain a certificate of public convenience
and necessity before construction or operation may pose an obstacle to
the use of such systems. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
has been granted authority by the National Utility Regulatory Policies
Act of 1978 to promulgate rules exempting qualifying cogeneration
facilities, which in most instances would include multi-user systems,
from state laws and regulations respecting electric utility regulation. 10 6
The exercise of this authority is likely to minimize the importance of
state certification procedures as an impediment to the use of shared solar
systems. However, the rule-making process will afford to the public,
which includes the states and utilities, the opportunity to comment on
the proposed rules and thus perhaps influence their final promulgation.
State law will control, of course, until such rules are actually pro-
mulgated. Non-exempted, large scale multi-user systems would still be
subject to state control and certification.
PART III: COMMERCIALIZATION OF DECENTRALIZED SOLAR EQUIPMENT
Some public utilities have already begun marketing solar equipment, 10 7
and some others have evidenced strong interest in being permitted to do
So.10 8 Factors which may not be readily apparent explain why the utilities
11
6Act of Nov. 9, 1978, § 210(e), Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (1978). Section 210(e) is
quoted supra note 98.
'
07J. WILLIAMS. SOLAR ENERGY AND THE GAS UTILITY 10 (1977).
10 In California several utilities, including San Diego Gas and Electric, Southern
California Gas, Southern California Edison, and the City of Santa Clara's municipal elec-
tric utility, have indicated an interest in solar marketing. STAFF OF SOLAR IMPLEMENTA-
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are interested in such market entry. Natural gas utilities envision solar
energy as a means to conserve dwindling supplies of natural gas by rely-
ing on solar energy to satisfy a portion of customer demand.1 9 Electric
utilities110 are more likely to focus on decentralized use of solar energy for
load management purposes. Widespread adoption of solar systems with
adequate storage capacities could significantly diversify utility customer
demand, smoothing out a utility's load curve to enable more efficient use
of plant facilities. Time of day pricing as it affects the operation of solar
energy systems is not the exclusive means to achieve load management
control.' However, to the extent that such systems are cost beneficial
compared with other control techniques and effective in diversifying de-
mand, the utilities are likely to be interested in greater solar utilization.1 12
Recent legislation deals specifically with utility involvement in the
commercialization of solar equipment. The National Energy Conserva-
tion Policy Act 1 3 includes a provision which prohibits utilities from sup-
plying, installing or financing solar energy equipment or other energy
conservation devices.' Definition, exemption and waiver provisions
operate, however, to make the prohibition less than absolute or complete.
Section 216(a)(1) provides that no public utility may "supply or install a
residential energy conservation measure," which is defined to include,
among other things, "devices to utilize solar energy or windpower for any
residential energy conservation purpose, including heating of water,
[and] space heating or cooling."" 5 The term "residential building" is
defined as "any building used for residential occupancy which... con-
tains at least one, but no more than four, dwelling units. .. ,.116 Thus,
utility participation is not prohibited either for industrial and com-
merical applications, or for residential buildings exceeding four units.
The Act also includes exemption provisions which could have relevance
to utility involvement in the commercialization of solar energy. The pro-
TION COMM., CALIF. ENERGY RESOURCES CONSERVATION & DEVELOPMENT COMM'N. SOLAR
ENERGY IN CALIFORNIA: RESIDENTIAL THERMAL APPLICATION V-3 (Draft Report 1978).
'091 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. APPLICATION OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY TO TODAY'S
ENERGY NEEDS 150 (1978). The Southern California Gas Co. has initiated a Solar Assisted
Gas Energy (SAGE) program. A test installation in El Toro, California supplies hot water
for 32 apartments and a laundry room. The SAGE system is estimated to save about 1,200
cubic feet of natural gas daily. SAGE Fact Sheet included in J. WILLIAMS. supra note 107.
"ONearly 100 electric utilities have developed projects in solar heating and cooling. ELEC-
TRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE. SURVEY OF ELECTRIC UTILITY SOLAR PROJECTS. ER
321-SR (1977).
"'See the references to time activated switches and ripple or radio controls in Miller &
Gerber, supra note 63.
121n 1975 capital costs to control a kilowatt of load on peak were $80 and $100 compared
with $100 to $300 per kilowatt for additional peaking capacity. Gilbert & deGrasse,
Prospects for Electric Utility Load Management PUB. UTIL. FORT. Aug. 28, 1975, at 19.
'National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3207
(1978).
'Id. at §216(2).
"'Id. at §210 (11)(H).
"16Id at §210 (9)(B).
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hibitions on supply, installation, and financing will not apply to any solar
equipment which the Secretary of Energy determines were being
installed on the date of enactment of the Act,117 nor to any supply
activities "which the Secretary determines were broadly advertised or for
which substantial preparations were completed on or before the date of
enactment" of the Act.1 18 Considerable discretion has been delegated to
the Secretary of Energy to ascertain those activities falling under the
rubric of "substantial preparations." Utilities which have engaged in ex-
tensive data accumulation and assessment with a view toward entering
the field arguably should be included. Additional discretionary authority
is delegated to the Secretary of Energy to grant temporary exemptions
for a period not to exceed three years." 9 A general exemption covers
devices associated with load management techniques, but limits the ex-
emption to techniques applicable to the type of energy sold by the
utility.2 ' Its application to solar equipment, therefore, would only relate
to photovoltaic systems supplied or financed by electric utilities.
The Act contains another extremely significant waiver provision. The
Secretary of Energy, upon a petition of a public utility supported by the
Governor, is authorized to waive in whole or in part the prohibitions on
the utility supplying, installing, and financing solar devices, though cer-
tain standards must be met.'2 ' The Secretary must be satisfied that in
engaging in the otherwise prohibited activities "fair and reasonable
prices and rates of interest would be charged" and the Secretary must
find, "after consultation with the Federal Trade Commission, that such
activities would not be inconsistent with the prevention of unfair
methods of competition and the prevention of unfair or deceptive acts or
practices."122
The net effect of Section 216 is not so much to absolutely prohibit the
supply, installation, and financing of solar equipment and other conser-
vation measures by interested utilities, as to extend federal regulation to
the pricing and competitive impact of utility activities in this area. In
essence, the Secretary of Energy has been delegated the authority to
determine on a case by case basis the extent to which utilities will be
allowed to participate in the commercialization of solar energy equipment
and other energy conservation devices. Congress has closed the field to




21 d at §216(b).
1"Id. at §216(e).
1 2 1d These provisions in the federal law are similar in effect to a recently enacted statute
in California. The state law requires that before a utility or its subsidiary could begin a
solar manufacturing or marketing program, the Public Utilities Commission would have to
find that the proposed program does not restrict competition or growth in solar develop-
ment. The law exempts affiliates of utilities. Public Utilities - Solar Energy Development,




public utilities until federal officials have had the opportunity to
scrutinize and approve a utility's proposed involvement. Although the
Act is not written in terms of licensing or certification, a form of prior ap-
proval is nonetheless made a condition to entry.
Although the National Energy Conservation Policy Act has a signifi-
cant impact on utility involvement in the commercialization of solar
equipment, it has by no means completely foreclosed its participation.
The current regulatory restriction might be removed if the policy makers
determined, for example, that solar energy was not being sufficiently
adopted by our society. Thus, consideration of all of the policy options
concerning utility marketing of solar equipment, including granting
utilities monopoly status, is still relevant. The existing legislation is
based upon policy considerations favoring competition over monopoly.
As the following discussion demonstrates, this preference is valid since
monopoly control by utilities cannot be justified under any of the tradi-
tional regulatory rationales.
The Act has also made more timely the consideration of the other two
policy options: A complete, absolute ban on utility involvement and the
allowance of competitive utility participation. The Act, in addition to
delegating authority, identifies some broad policy considerations. The
Secretary of Energy and his advisors must now further refine these
policies in order to respond to petitions which may be forthcoming from
utilities.123 This task will hopefully be undertaken with a careful con-
sideration of each of these options and of the consequences
accompanying them. The following analysis deals with the major factors
which should affect the Secretary's decisions.
Extending the Monopoly Franchise of Public Utilities
Various rationales have been developed to support the legal restriction
of free entry into businesses. When applied to the extent of allowing en-
try by only one firm, monopoly conditions exist. This section analyzes
the four major criteria for limiting entry: Natural monopoly conditions,
limited physical resources, cream-skimming, and destructive competi-
tion.
Natural Monopoly Conditions
The primary rationale for government support of monopoly status is
the principle of natural monopoly. 2 4 The principle is based on the realiza-
'"'The Secretary may, upon petition of a public utility, supported in the case of a
regulated utility by a Governor, waive in whole or in part the prohibition [against
supplying, installing, and financing residential energy conservation measures] with
respect to the utility.... National Energy Conservation Policy Act of 1978, §216(e), Pub.
L. No. 95-619, 92 Stat. 3207 (1978).1122 A. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 116-17 (1971).
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tion that monopolies represent the most efficient form of market
organization for industries having certain economic and physical
characteristics. Although most of the public utilities in this country'25
originated under conditions of competition, their evolution led to price
wars, deteriorated service, and eventual consolidations. 2 6 This historic
trend of failure of the competitive forces in these industries eventually
resulted in state regulation, which protects the public by setting prices
and providing for required levels of services. The regulatory legislation
also creates monopoly positions for utilities thereby allowing them to
realize the most efficient means of production.'2 7
An industry is subject to the law of increasing returns when unit costs
tend to decline as output is increased.28 The existence of this economic
characteristic over the entire extent of the market is the essential pre-
requisite of natural monopoly. 12 9 Related and additional characteristics,
including economies of scale, direct connections of supplier and customer,
and diversified demand characteristics are related elements in the
makeup of natural monopoly. As demonstrated below, since these
characteristics are absent, no justification exists for giving the utilities
an exclusive franchise based on natural monopoly conditions for the com-
mercialization of solar equipment.
Declining unit costs resulting from increases in output essentially
follow from the extensive fixed or capital costs which some industries
must incur.2 0 As production increases, the fixed plant costs are allocated
among a greater number of units, thereby decreasing the costs for each
'
25See Pace, Relevan'f Markets and the Nature of Competition in the Electric Utility In-
dustry, 16 ANTITRUST BULL. 725 (1971) for a discussion of the proposition that "to the ex-
tent that the characterization of electric utilities as natural monopolists is no longer ac-
curate, it follows also that traditional market definitions are no longer appropriate." Id. at
727. The article explores "how one may define meaningfully for the electric utility industry
those markets within which competitive forces are or could be at Dlav." Id.
'
26Competition "favored the public for a time with low rates, but invariably at the
expense of a deteriorated service. Financial exhaustion of one or more of the companies
eventually brought about a complete consolidation, or an agreement as to rates or ter-
ritory." 2 A. KAHN. supra note 124, at 118, citing BEHLING. COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN
PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 20 (1938). For an excellent discussion of the development of
both public utilities and the regulatory controls over them see W. JONES. CASES AND
MATERIALS ON REGULATED INDUSTRIES 1-69 (2d ed. 1976).
"'E.g., Idaho Power & Light Co. v. Blomquist, 26 Idaho 222, 141 P. 1083 (1914)(upheld
restrictions on entry of electric utilities since several suppliers would create inefficiency
and the financial stability of existing companies necessitated a restriction on competition).
'
28Before the turn of the century Henry Carter Adams distinguished such industries
from those subject to laws of constant returns and those subject to the law of increasing
returns. See H.C. ADAMS, RELATION OF THE STATE TO INDUSTRIAL ACTION (1887).
"
9
"The critical and- if properly defined- all-embracing characteristic of natural
monopoly is an inherent tendency to decreasing unit costs over the entire extent of the
market." 2 A. KAHN. supra note 124, at 119. "An industry where the single-firm average
cost curve declines over the entire range of demand is called a 'natural monopoly'
industry." D. BOIES & P. VERKUIL. PUBLIC CONTROL OF BUSINESS 27 (1977). Natural
monopoly is an industry where "the long-run unit cost function declines continuously out
to a scale of output which saturates potential market demand." F. SCHERER. INDUSTRIAL
MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 520 (1970).
"'02 A. KAHN. supra note 124, at 119.
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the utility is likely to exist, if at all, only in the short run. The likelihood
of a permissive attitude accompanying a reduction in demand occasioned
unit of production.13 1 While all plants are subject to such economic prin-
ciples within their production capacity limits,13 2 high fixed costs alone do
not lead to natural monopoly conditions. 33 Decreasing unit costs over the
entire range of demand are attainable only when an industry can realize
significant economies of scale.13 4 Such economies result when a larger
plant or production unit can produce at less cost than several smaller
plants or units. Under these conditions, a single supplier becomes the
most efficient producer.'3 5
If the utilities market solar equipment they will clearly have to raise
and invest significant sums of money either to manufacture the equip-
ment themselves or to procure it elsewhere. Declining unit costs in the
manufacture and marketing of solar panels will be limited to those which
can be realized from production utilizing greater manufacturing plant
capacity or from discounts related to volume purchases. 3 6 Neither the
manufacturing nor the marketing has technological advantages related
to size of output so as to give rise to economies of scale, nor do the ex-
isting utilities have any inherent advantages in this regard over other
suppliers. Although electric utilities realize economies of scale in the
generation and transmission of electricity, 37 as do gas utilities in
distributing natural gas, those economies of scale are not applicable to
their commercialization of solar equipment. Sales and leases of solar pro-
ducts are like the retailing of other home heating and cooling equipment,
and such retailing business is not subject to economies of scale.
Marketing solar energy systems lacks another characteristic common
to natural monopolies. The public utility natural monopoly markets have
"lines" which connect the supplier with the consumer. 138 The significant
111p. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY. PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 17 (1964).
'322 A. KAHN. supra note 124, at 121 & n. 20.
131d. at 121.
'4"Finally, economies of scale tend toward monopoly only if costs are still declining
when market demand is exhausted. If costs of operation level off at some point short of
that at which market demand is satisfied, an industry can accommodate multiple firms of
optimal scale." W. JONES. supra note 126, at 51.
'"3"The dominant reason for the failure of competition to survive in the utility industry is
the fact that utilities operate at or near lowest average cost, in supplying a particular
market, when free from the competition of other sellers of the same service." P. GARFIELD
& W. LOVEJOY, supra note 131, at 16.
'""A business enterprise that is relatively large can realize economies from buying in
large quantities. The overhead cost of purchasing ar'e [sic] subject to decreasing average
charges as the size and volume of purchases increase. Further, large buyers receive
economies of quantity and volume discount given by the seller filling large orders." Id. at
18.
'"3Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of Government
Regulation, 15 J. OF L. & ECON. 151, 154 (1972).
138W. JONES, supra note 126, at 51-52. Examples of these lines are the underground pipes
in natural gas and water utilities, transmission wires for electricity, and rails for railroads.
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investment in these lines 3 9 is the basis of the natural monopoly 4 since
their duplication by a competitor creates more capacity than is required
and thereby unit costs are raised.14 1 Physical lines of connection do not
have to be constructed before a sale or lease of solar equipment can be
made.
The fixed lines between the supplier and customer result in the creation
of a geograiphical market which can serve customers only in that area.
The fixed costs of investment in these permanent connections can thus be
recovered only in the market in which they are constructed. On the other
hand, the supplier of solar equipment, like the manufacturer or retailer of
electrical or gas appliances, is not bound by such market constraints,
since these services can be more easily shifted to other markets.
The relationship of diversity of demand to possible economies of scale
is yet another aspect of the natural monopoly concept which is inap-
plicable to solar equipment supply activities. When a single firm has an
entire service market the prospects of diversity are enhanced. 4 1 In
serving all of the market, the types of customer demands and the times at
which they occur are more likely to vary. The monopolist can thus serve
the entire market more efficiently, since the off-peak services are deter-
mined against a single market peak.4 3 Solar equipment sales, however,
are unrelated to such concepts of diversity. The seller is not under the
obligation to meet the customer's demand instantaneously. The
customer demand is also singular, not recurring, and is thus not affected
by concepts such as time of demand.
Limited Physical Resources
Even in the absence of natural monopoly characteristics, limits on en-
try can be justified in some industries on the basis of a need to allocate
limited physical resources. 44 The. television and radio broadcasting
bands provide an excellent example. Since transmissions on the same fre-
quency within the same geographic area will cause intolerable in-
terference, a system of licensing is used to allocate the limited number of
'39Fixed costs "often exceed one-half the total company cost of service in the electric and
other utility industries." P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY. supra note 131, at 151. The electric
power industry is "the largest in the United States in terms of capital assets, sixty percent
larger than its nearest rival." SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ELECTRIC POWER AND THE
ENVIRONMENT, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK. ELECTRICITY AND THE..
ENVIRONMENT 23 (1972). Only about one-half of the capital costs are attributable to
generating facilities, thereby demonstrating that a significant portion of a utility's capita
costs are devoted to transmission and distribution facilities. P. Joskow, Applying
Economic Principles to Public Utility Rate Structures: The Case of Electricity, in STUDIES
IN ELECTRIC UTILITY REGULATION 17 (C. Cicchetti and J. Jurewitz eds. 1975).
,4",'While the local distribution and long distance transmission of electricity have natural
monopoly characteristics, the generation of electricity has characteristics more analogous
to manufacturing-i.e., economies of scale up to a point, with multiple producers feasible
beyond that point if there is a sufficiently broad market for the product." W. JONES. supra
note 126, at 52.
1'4Cf 2 A. KAHN. supra note 124, at 121 & n. 21.14 d. at 122.
143p. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra note 131, at 18.
144T. MORGAN, ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS, 57 (1976).
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frequencies to broadcasters. Since the demand for licenses exceeds their
supply the licensing regulation restricts entry into the broadcasting
field.145 If entry is restricted to a single firm, as for example in the licens-
ing of hydro-electric plant development along a particular location on a
river,146 the successful entrant acquires a monopolistic position sup-
ported by regulation with regard to the affected physical resource. 147
By contrast, the required resources for the development of com-
mericalized solar energy are abundant. For all practical purposes the sup-
ply of sunshine is without limit; indeed this availability makes decen-
tralized exploitation feasible. Nor are the natural resources necessary to
manufacture solar equipment unique or in short supply. 148 In short, solar
resources are not limited, so this second rationale will not support any
restriction on the number of entrants to the field, let alone justify the
creation of a monopoly position. 1
9
Prevention of Cream-Skimming
The prevention of cream-skimming as a basis for restricting free entry
into a field has at least two distinct facets. One is the concern that new
entrants in a field will deal only in the most lucrative sectors of the
market avoiding. the less attractive sections.110 This possibility is par-
ticularly significant with public utilities since they operate under an
obligation to serve all of their market, despite losses on some service.1 51
1547 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
"'16 U.S.C. §§797(e), 817 (1976).
"'Even if the rationale of limited supply of physical resources were applicable to decen-
tralized solar energy exploitation, the existing utilities would not be an inevitable choice to
occupy the preferred position. As in the case of broadcasting license allocation by the
Federal Communications Commission, criteria for the selection of licensees would have to
be established. See e.g., Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C. 2d
393 (1965).
""'Both solar heating and thermal electric systems use large quantities of steel, con-
crete, aluminum, copper, plastic and glass." Baron, Solar Energy-Will It Conserve
Nonrenewable Resources? 102 PUB. UTIL. FORT.. September 28, 1978, at 32.
"'Even though the resources required to construct solar systems are not rare, they still
are nonrenewable. This latter characteristic leads to some important conservation con-
siderations.
If solar energy applications are to be successful, the energy consumed for
fabrication, construction, and operation of these plants must be less than the
energy recovered by these solar systems over their operating life. If the
cumulative consumption of nonrenewable resources of natural gas, oil, coal,
and uranium to build and operate solar energy plants is significantly large
compared to the recovered energy, then we have not achieved the conserva-
tioraobjective for solar energy. In addition, the magnitude of consumption of
nonrenewable resources is a measure of the economic and environmental
acceptability of solar energy. If more eriergy is consumed in the construction
of these plants than is recovered by the solar systems, there is no purpose in
developing the technology unless designs are forthcoming which are less
energy intensive.
152 A. KAHN, supra note 124, at 7.
15Id. at 8, 221-22. See also Harriss, Taxation of Public Utilities: Considerations for the
Long Run, 43 TAXEs 660, 665-66 (1965).
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This affirmative obligation might leave them unable to meet their total
service obligations if their most profitable markets were skimmed away
by competitors operating free of such obligations. Therefore, free entry in
public utility markets is generally limited. This aspect of the cream-
skimming rationale does not justify granting the utilities an exclusive
franchise in marketing solar equipment because they are not under any
obligation to serve the entire market.
The second aspect of the cream-skimming rationale is based on promo-
tional considerations.' Sometimes the market potential of an industry
must be developed before anyone will be in a position to tap it. The enter-
prising firm which undertakes promotion may find its competitors
reaping the benefits of its promotional efforts. The realization that rival
firms may later invade the market without undertaking any of the pro-
motional costs may lead to an unwillingness to undertake such develop-
ment. Limitations on entry are sometimes raised in order to encourage in-
itial developers to engage in needed promotions. Such protection from
competition, however, has generally been provided only in high risk
transportation ventures.
53
Promotional activities are clearly needed to develop the market poten-
tial of the solar equipment industry. People must be informed of recent
advances in solar technology. They must also be convinced of solar
system capability, reliability, and cost effectiveness before they will "go
solar." However, the number of solar manufacturers and marketing firms
is quite large.1 64 This present involvement indicates a willingness to enter
the field and undertake the necessary promotional activities without
regulatory support limiting entry of other competitors.
Prevention of Destructive Competition
The presence or potential for economic competition which leads to a
deterioration of service quality is yet another rationale for limitation on
free entry to a market. 55 This rationale constituted at least part of the
justification for allowing monopolies for the electric and natural gas
utilities. The era of competition during the early development of these in-
dustries was marked by intensive price wars which in many instances so
reduced the revenues of the involved companies that they were unable to
provide adequate service. 156 This failure of the competitive approach,
together with the natural monopoly conditions that came to prevail with
1522 A. KAHN, supra note 124, at 233-35.
"
3See id at 8-10, 233-35.
1"4"The growing public interest in solar heating is evidenced by the installation of
thousands of systems installed in the U.S. in the past two years, with an estimated 500
companies offering components and systems on a commerical basis." Baron, supra note
148, at 31, citing A National Plan for Energy Research, Development and Demonstration,
ERDA 77-1, June 1977 at 25-27.
1552 A. KAHN. supra note 124, at 173-78.
'I'D. BOIES & P. VERKUIL. supra note 129, at 29.
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technological innovations affecting the economies of scale, spurred the
legal recognition of monopoly positions in these industries.157
Unrestrained competition in the marketing of decentralized solar
systems does have a strong potential to adversely affect the quality of
the product sold, as distinguished from the deterioration of service
quality. Intensive price competition is likely to lower the selling price of
the equipment, and along with it the profit margin of suppliers and
retailers. As that profit margin narrows, the temptation increases to cut
costs by skimping on safety and reliability features. The detection of
such deficiencies will be difficult for the consumer due to unfamiliarity
with solar technology. Solar equipment is also a relatively durable pro-
duct, generally designed for use over a period of many years. The adverse
affects on performance may not become apparent until the product has
been used for several of those years. By then, irresponsible sellers may
have become insolvent or have disappeared.
Unrestrained competition might lead to deteriorations of product.
quality in the solar equipment business. Yet the problem does not appear
to require direct restraints on entry or the granting of a monopoly posi-
tion, since well-conceived quality control standards and financial
responsibility legislation could achieve the same objectives.1 58 Even
though public utilities are permanently established institutions subject
to close scrutiny by regulatory commissions, and therefore likely to
stand behind their solar products, such advantages at best favor allowing
them to enter the market, but not to secure a monopoly position therein.
Thus, none of the criteria for limiting entry can justify extending the
monopoly position of public utilities to include the marketing of solar
equipment.
Prohibiting Entry by Public Utilities
While extending the monopoly position of public utilities is at one end
of the spectrum of possible reactions to solar development, the absolute
prohibition of utility participation appears at the other extreme. The
National Energy Conservation Policy Act has implemented this option,
subject to waiver powers granted to the Secretary of Energy.1 9 The argu-
ment justifying the ban on public utilities from the commercialization of
solar products essentially takes two forms. One is the fear that utilities
will retard the development of solar technology; the other is the concern
that utility involvement will constitute unfair competition.
""'Public utility rate regulation came about as a means to control monopoly power
which had been allowed to exist at the pleasure of the Government in order to prevent
'destructive competition' among utilities." Oldham, Rate Base Determination and Profits
to Affiliates, 39 COLO. L. REV. 509 (1967).
"'See 2 A. KAHN. supra note 124, at 177-78.
"'Supra notes 113 through 123 and accompany text.
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Possible Limitations on Technological Development
A utility's involvement in the marketing of solar equipment could
retard the development of solar technology in a number of ways. If solar
power were regarded as a competitive energy form which could cause
declining revenues, a utility might attempt to stifle or limit its use. This
hindrance could be accomplished, for example, by acquiring patent rights
or through public expressions of skepticism and doubt about solar
energy. 60 However, even if utilities assumed the opposite approach and
attempted to advance the development of the solar resource, the growth
of technology could still be restrained. The utilities are likely to direct
their efforts toward solar technologies which interrelate with their tradi-
tional services. Using an intensive research and development program
the utilities might quickly assume a paramount position which could
diminish or even foreclose the chances for alternative forms of develop-
ment of solar technology. 16
1
On the other hand, the policymakers should recognize that a complete
ban on the public utilities will exclude an entity which has a proven
record in technological development. For example, the utilities have
made significant reductions in the amount of coal used in the generation
of power.1 6 2 The development of larger, more economical generating
equipment also has resulted in considerable economies of scale.1
6 3
Although the devastating effects of inflation levels in recent years have
reversed the trend of decreasing costs in electric utility economics, im-
160Barnes, Who'll Control Sun Power? The Solar Derby, THE NEW REPUBLIC. February 1,
1975 at 19.
'
61For a discussion of conflicting views concerning the benefits and detriments of oil com-
pany involvement in the development of non-oil energy assets, see Note, Horizontal In-
tegration in the Energy Industry, 29 BAYLOR L. REV. 941, 961-68 (1977).
162 [T]he comsumption of coal to produce steam for electric generation has
steadily decreased on a per-kilowatt-hour basis as a result of increasing
technological efficiency. While an average of about 6.7 pounds of coal was re-
quired per kilowatt-hour generated in 1902, modern plants require less than
one pound. In 1960 the national average was 0.88 pound per kilowatt-hour.
P. GARFIELD & W. LOVEJOY, supra note 131, at 149.
163 In 1930, the average size of all steam-electric units was 20 megawatts. By
1955, when larger units began to come on-line in significant numbers, the
average unit size had jumped to 35 megawatts and the largest unit had in-
creased to 300 megawatts. Subsequent years showed a continuous progres-
sion of larger units until 1974, when four 1,300-megawatt units were in opera-
tion and a 1,500 megawatt unit was projected to come on-line in 1983. Even if
future units do not increase greatly in size, the average unit size will continue
to expand as older and smaller units are retired. While unit size increased,
plant size also grew. In 1972, the largest steam-electric plant in the United
States was the seven-unit Sammis plant of Ohio Edison with 2,889
megawatts of capacity. In 1948, the largest plant had a capacity of 881
megawatts and there was only one other plant with a capacity of over 500
megawatts.
D. SCOTT, FINANCING THE GROWTH OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 27-28 (1976) (footnotes omitted).
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proved technology is still very impotant.1 6 This same type of
technological innovation is imperative for advancement of the state of
the art of solar energy exploitation. The involvement of electric utilities
in the field could provide important technological impetus.
Whether the potential for retarding technological development is a per-
suasive justification for prohibiting utility entry depends largely upon
whether solar energy will be perceived by the utilities as a threat. The
potential threat of solar energy is easy to perceive, especially with long-
term projections. Extensive use of this alternative energy source can
signify decreasing revenues for the utilities. Future economic feasibility
of photovoltaic systems which convert solar energy directly into
electricity raises the specter of considerable independence from public
utilities. The desire for self-preservation might motivate utilities to seek
means to stall such developments, but such a reaction is by no means in-
evitable. Some utilites have already perceived solar energy as valuable
rather than as a threat. Solar energy could provide utilities with an effec-
tive means of conserving dwindling conventional fuel sources and, in con-
nection with load management techniques, in more efficiently utilizing
existing utility plant capacity.
Relatively recent changes in the economic environment in which
utilities must now operate, although by no means conclusive, suggest
reasons why some utilities might favor an integration of solar energy into
their operations. For a number of years the average unit cost for
electricity declined at an impressive rate.1 65 During the 1970's, however,
those declining rates were reversed. Many of the factors which had
favored utility marketing changed concurrently during the late sixties
and early seventies.1 6 Inflation increased capital construction costs. 167
16 During prior years, when price increases were relatively low, improved
technology and economies of scale more than offset the burden of inflation
and yielded a decreasing cost industry. Recently, however, this utopian set of
factors has been replaced by a level of inflation against which the utilities
have not been able to compensate.
Id at 42.
'
61"While in 1931 the average residential consumer used 583 kilowatt-hours at an
average rate of 5.78 cents per kilowatt-hour, the average consumption in 1960 was 3,827
kilowatt-hours and the average rate was 2.47 cents per kilowatt-hour." P. GARFIELD & W.
LOVEJOY, supra note 131, at 150.
[Ellectric rates have declined through time despite a sharply rising general
price level and increasing costs in the economy as a whole. For example, as of
January 1, 1960, the weighted average bill for 500 kilowatts of residential ser-
vice per month was $10.62, whereas the same service had cost $13.87 in 1935.
This comparison is all the more impressive in light of the doubling of the
general price level during this period.
I& at 149.
1"D. Scorr. supra note 163, at 1-2, 37.
167 Inflation has had a severe impact upon capital costs of electric utilities. Pro-
jections for nuclear plants to come on-line in the early 1980s estimate costs at
over $700 per kilowatt. Cost estimates for coal-fired plants for commerical
operation in the same period are over $600 per kilowatt. This compares with a
1967 Atomic Energy Commission projection for 1972 operation of $134 and
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Capital spending by electric utilities rose from three billion dollars in
1948 to over twenty billion dollars in 1974.168 Fuel costs escalated
rapidly. The cost of fuel oil rose approximately 400 percent, and the cost
of gas more than 175 percent between 1972 and 1977.119 Environmental
regulations have required utilities to invest considerable sums of money.
In 1974 electric utilities spent approximately 1.3 billion dollars on pollu-
tion controls compared to 4.0 billion dollars for all manufacturing in-
dustries.1 7 0 Because regulatory lag delayed the implementation of rate in-
creases, revenues have not always kept pace with increasing costs.
Widespread customer adoption of solar systems, together with time of
day pricing of backup service to encourage greater diversity, could pro-
vide a means for some utilities to begin avoiding the full impact of these
cost escalators. With better daily diversity the utility could use existing
plant capacity more efficiently and thus eliminate the need to construct.
the additional capacity which would be required if this demand were to
remain on-peak. Eliminating the need to expand would enable the utility
to avoid the effects of inflation tied to such new construction, including
investment in costly pollution control equipment.171 Since solar energy
would provide some of the customer demand, total energy requirements
on the utility would be less and utility fuel costs would be reduced
accordingly. These considerations could lead some utilities to actively
promote and develop technology for solar systems.
Unfair Competition
The potential for unfair competition is probably the more urgent con-
cern advanced in support of complete prohibition of public utility
involvement in supplying solar systems. The National Energy Conserva-
tion Policy Act indicates it was foremost in the minds of the draftsmen of
this legislation. Section 213 (b)(1) provides that the Secretary of Energy
is not to approve any residential energy conservation plan for regulated
$100 per kilowatt, respectively. It should be noted that the 1967 estimate was
in constant prices, while the more recent projection included a factor for cost
escalation.'
Id. at 95.
168 d. at 96.
16 "After remaining relatively constant in price throughout the 1960's, fossil-fuel costs
began a rise in 1970 that gained momentum with each passing year. Cost increases over
the decade 1964-74 amounted to 190 percent for coal, 89 percent for gas, and 488 percent
for oil." Id at 48. "Overall, the distribution of total electric revenues required to pay for
fuel increased from 19.8 percent in 1970, to 24.3 percent in 1973, to 34.8 percent in 1974."
I01d. at 47.
17 The U.S. electric utility industry alone anticipates a need for $650 billion over
the next fifteen years to meet new energy demands. To meet that need, the
electric utilities will have to raise $400 billion in the capital market-four and
one-half times the amount raised over the past fifteen years.




utilities submitted by a participating state unless "such plan contains
adequate measures for preventing unfair, deceptive, or anti-competitive
acts or practices '172 in implementing utility programs in the state.
17
1
Similar language is utilized in Section 216(e) of the Act dealing with stan-
dards for waiving the prohibition of utility activity in providing and
financing energy conservation measures. 174
With the utilities' substantial investment in conventional generating
equipment, the concern is that they will be interested in restricting the
competitive energy source and not in promoting it. Public utilities might
effectively use their superior financial strength and the flow of their
monopoly profits to drive smaller rivals out of business. On the other
hand, unfair competition, like the stifling of technological development,
can also occur under conditions in which the utilities actively seek to
utilize rather than suppress the solar resource. Business advantages from
existing utility contacts with customers might accrue to utilities which
would make it too difficult for other entities to compete.
Appliance sales and promotional inducements by electric and gas
utilities provide some historical support for the concern over unfair com-
petition with utility involvement. In the past, utilities were actively in-
volved in the sale of large domestic appliances such as ranges and hot
water heaters 75 since these sales17 increased the demand for electric and
natural gas service. The advantages of increased demand for utility ser-
vices were so great that some utilities even sold appliances at a loss. 1 7
17The language mirrors that of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15
U.S.C. §45.
1'Each state is authorized to submit a proposed residential energy conservation plan to
the Secretary of Energy for his approval. §212(c)(1)(A). Each plan must comply with the
rules and standards to be promulgated by the Secretary. §212(a). The statute also iden-
tifies specific standards which must be included in these rules. §212(b). No proposed
residential energy conservation plan can be approved unless specific provisions are
included. §§213 and 214. If a state does not propose a plan within the specified time limita-
tions, the Secretary is authorized to promulgate one for it. §219(a).
"1"The Secretary may ... waive in whole or in part the prohibitions ... if... the
Secretary finds, after consultation with the Federal Trade Commission, that such
activities would not be inconsistent with the prevention of unfair methods of competition
and the prevention of unfair or deceptive acts or practices." §216(e).
" Home demonstrations proved highly successful and were facilitated by the
utilities' access to marketing information such as names, address and finan-
cial ratings of customers. Monthly billing systems accommodated deferred
payment plans offered with minimal interest charges. Monthly visits by
customers to power company offices to pay their bills provided an additional
opportunity to promote the use of appliances. Indeed, power company
showrooms grew into medium and large-sized stores and often occupied most
of the main floor of the conveniently located offices.
C. THOMPSON & W. SMITH. PUBLIC UTILITY ECONOMICS 510 (1941).
"6A 1937 survey of 140 electric utilities showed that 129 of them sold appliances to
residential users. These sales represented more than one-third of the total dollar volume of
appliance sales. 111 ELECTRICAL WORLD. March 11, 1939, at 697.
'"Subcomm. No. 5 of the Select Co-inm. on Small Business, Promotional Practices by
Public Utilities and Their Effect Upon Small Business, H.R. Rep. No. 1984, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 124 (1968) [hereinafter Promotional Practices Report] (letter from Edwin M. Zimmer-
man, Ass't Atty. Gen., Antitrust Div., Dept. of Justice to Congressman John D. Dingell,
Nov. 8, 1968) [hereinafter Zimmerman letter].
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Utilities also used a number of promotional practices designed to induce
builders of multi-unit structures and developments to use one energy
source exclusively and to encourage individuals to shift from one source
of energy to another. These practices included "cash payments, free
underground trenching, free appliances, free advertising, free installation
of appliances, low-cost financing, and guaranteed rates." 178 The utilities
considered these inducements to be necessary in order to effectively com-
pete in markets which had been predominantly served by other utilities
or by fuel oil companies. 179 These types of activities resulted in claims by
appliance retailers and other companies in affected markets that the
utility involvement constituted unfair competition.180
The anti-competitive consequences of past promotional inducements
are not as likely to apply to the utility marketing of solar equipment. The
close scrutiny in the late sixties of utility promotional activities' 8'
resulted in states prohibiting utilities from engaging in many of these
types of activities. 82 Some of the remaining incentives, however, can be
used by the utilities to encourage solar energy utilization. The California
Public Utilities Commission, for example, has adopted a policy of
granting the maximum allowable line extension credits for housing
179 Competition among suppliers of various forms of energy has intensified
greatly during the last 5 to 10 years. Prior to this each of the principal energy
sources-electricity, natural gas, and fuel ol-operated largely in separate
markets. Electricity enjoyed a natural monopoly with respect to energy
needed for basic needs such as lighting, most household appliances, etc.
Natural gas, in areas favored with a pipeline connection to the producing
areas, served principally space and water heating needs. Fuel oil
predominated as a source of heating energy in areas remote from natural gas
pipelines or so remote from natural gas producing areas as to reduce the cost
advantage frequently enjoyed by natural gas....
One of the most intense areas of competition is in water and space heating.
The electric utilities, because of the high cost of electricity vis-a-vis natural
gas and fuel oil, have had to overcome consumer resistance to electric space
and water heat. According to data submitted to [the] committee by the Na-
tional Oil Jobbers Council, the electric utilities had almost none of the home
heating market in 1947, and in 1957 accounted for only 4 percent of the
heating installed in new construction. In contrast, gas had 15 percent of the
home heating market in 1947 and 34 percent in 1957, and fuel oil had 85 per-
cent of that market in 1947 and 62 percent in 1957.
Promotional Practices Report, supra note 176, at 124 (Zimmerman letter).
1801d
"'Hearings were held in 1968 by a subcommittee of the Select Committee on Small
Business on the subject of "Promotional Practices by Public Utilities and Their Impact
Upon Small Business" as "a result of the various complaints received from numerous
small businessmen engaged in diverse fields of endeavor as the wholesaling of heating and
cooling equipment, consulting engineers, oil jobbers, and appliance wholesalers and
retailers." Promotional Practices Report, supra note 176, at 1. Their investigation led the
members of the subcommittee "to question both the usefulness and propriety of these pro-
motional allowances." Id at 94.
"'See e.g., STAFF OF SOLAR IMPLEMENTATION COMM., supra note 33, at IV-27.
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developments using solar devices.1 8 3
The anti-competitive influences associated with past utility appliance
sales activities are possible, although for different reasons, with sales of
solar equipment, but they are also unlikely due to state regulatory
responses. Solar systems, unlike major appliances, will decrease total
consumer demand for utility gas and electric service, not increase it. Still
the forceful economic factors of inflation, escalating fuel costs, and pollu-
tion control expenses have modified the objectives of utilities.8 4 Rather
than seeking to increase demand, which will necessitate further expan-
sion of plant capacity, most utilities are currently more interested in
diversifying demand in order to avoid expansion,'8 5 which is partly
evidenced by the number of utilities that have abandoned the appliance
sales business."'8 Assuming that time of day pricing proves an effective
means of securing load management controls over the operation of solar
systems,8 7 the utilities might be tempted to underprice solar equipment
in order to promote greater service demand diversification. However, the
arguments supporting refusals of state regulatory commissions to allow
the inclusion of losses incurred on promotional sales of appliances as
legitimate operating expenses in calculating utility rates would be equal-
ly applicable to such pricing of solar equipment. 8
The most serious facet of the concern over possible unfair competition
stems from the unique position occupied by the utilities. The utilities
have direct contact with nearly every American home, and these contacts
"'See supra notes 165-70 and accompanying text.
The electric utility industry is tremendously capital intensive. Companies
engaged in the production of electric power must spend nearly $4.50 for
assets to produce a dollar of revenue, compared with all manufacturing in-
dustries which spend only S.60 per dollar of revenue. It is this large amount of
fixed expenses which has guided financial policies of the industry.
D. Sco'r. supra note 163, at 95.
116By 1962 fewer than one-third of the 200 largest electric utilities still sold appliances,
and most of those operated through cooperative programs with local dealers. 95 ELEC.
MERCHANTS WEEKLY. January 21, 1963 at 91. Between 1966 and 1971 the number of power
companies selling appliances further declined another 25%. 107 ELEC. MERCHANTS WEEK.
LY. April 28, 1975 at 3.
" See supra note 56-63 and accompanying text.
188 In times past, many utilities, especially electric and gas firms, have operated
appliance businesses or services, sometimes attracting sales by underselling
independent competitors. Sales of utility services associated with the ap-
pliances might thus be increased, and appliance sales losses could be charged
as operating expenses of the parent utility company.... Commissions now
rule, with only a few exceptions, that nonutility expenses and revenues must
be carefully segregated and that nonutility operations of a utility firm must
stand or fall on their own.
M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON, supra note 74, at 98. See e.g., Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 43
P.U.R. 3d 210, 225-27 (N.Y.P.S.C. 1962); Lowell Gas Co. v. Dept. of Pub. Util. 324 Mass.
80, 84 N.E.2d 811, 822. "[Ihe primary purpose of the company in engaging in the sale of
appliances is to utilize the most effective and least expensive way of building additional
gas load and maintaining the present load of the company." Peoples Gas Light & Coke Co.,
99 P.U.R.N.S. 361, 379 (Ill. Com. Comm'n 1953) (allowing as a legitimate sales promotion
expense the losses incurred in connection with the sales of gas appliances).
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would give them a significant advantage in the competitive commer-
cialization of solar equipment. Direct solicitations, for example, would be
possible at small incremental costs in the billing correspondence or
through service calls. This advantage would be difficult for private firms
to overcome."8 9
The National Energy Conservation Policy Act, however, requires the
establishment of even further contacts between utilities and residential
customers. Utilities are required to inform their residential customers of
suggested conservation measures (including solar devices), expected
energy cost savings associated with each measure, and lists of suppliers
and financers of such measures. 190 The Act also makes the utility a pro-
ject manager by requiring it to offer to inspect residential buildings,
estimate purchase and installation costs of conservation measures and
anticipated savings, and arrange for installation and financing."' Due to
"'Other views have been expressed:
It will be extremely difficult for any organization to monopolize the solar in-
dustry because of the inherent diversity of approaches; there will probably
always be intense competition between different designs. Probably the most
serious danger to competitiveness in the solar industry is the Federal Govern-
ment itself. The potential for competition between different organizations
and different engineering concepts could be distorted if Federal funding is
unwisely allocated.
1 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, APPLICATION OF SOLAR TECHNOLOGY TO TODAY'S
ENERGY NEEDS 100 (1978).
190 Each utility program shall include procedures designed to inform, no later
than January 1, 1980, or the date six months after the approval of the ap-
plicable plan under section 212, if later, and each two years thereafter before
January 1, 1985, each of its residential customers who owns or occupies a
residential building, of-
(1) the suggested measures for the category of buildings which includes
such residential building;
(2) the savings in energy costs that are likely to result from installation
of the suggested measures in typical residential buildings in such
category;
(3) the availability of the arrangements described in subsection (b) and
the lists referred to in section 213(a)(2) and (3); and
(4) suggestions of energy conservation techniques, including sugges-
tions developed by the Secretary, such as adjustments in energy
use patterns and modifications of household activities which can be
employed by the residential customer to save energy and which do
not require the installation of energy conservation measures (in-
cluding the savings in energy costs that are likely to result from the
adoption of such suggestions).
§215(a).
191 Each utility program shall include--
(1) procedures whereby the public utility, no later than January 1,
1980, or the date six months after the approval of the applicable
plan under section 212, if later, will, for each residential customer
who owns or occupies a residential building, offer to-
(A) inspect the residential building (either directly or through one or
more inspectors under contract) to determine and inform the
residential customer of the estimated cost of purchasing and
installing the suggested measures and the savings in energy costs
that are likely to result from the installation of such measures (a
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the extensive nature of these contacts, together with the obvious poten-
tial for conflicts of interest, Congress may have stacked the deck against
involvement by the utilities in the actual commercialization activities.
The potential for unfair competition has been greatly increased through
these requirements of expanded utility contacts with potential solar
customers.
If the increased contacts between utilities and their customers so
heighten the prospects of unfair competition that the Secretary of
Energy is unable to grant any waivers to utility prohibition, 92 the new
Act will give rise to some startling consequences. Utilities earnestly
desiring to enter the business will be shut out, whereas the position of
utilities that wish to retard the competitive viability of solar energy
will be improved. Cast into the role of energy advisor to homeowners, the
utility that perceives a threat from solar energy is in the position to sow
doubts about solar energy. While the more obvious abuses can surely be
prevented by regulation, the more subtle abuses may not be. Since the
utilities' informational and advisory services must extend to all forms of
energy conservation measures, and not just solar equipment, a utility
program could de-emphasize solar energy simply through enthusiastic
support for other measures. Carefully worded statements made during
residents appraisals would be particularly difficult to regulate.
The reason for the decision to make the utilities responsible to
disseminate information, inspect and appraise homes, and arrange for in-
stallation and financing seems quite apparent. All utility rate payers will
pay for the costs of disseminating the required information, since the Act
requires these costs to be treated as current operating costs.1 9 3 It leaves
to the discretion of each state's regulatory body the authority to deter-
mine whether to treat the remaining costs (home inspection, appraisal,
arranging financing, and installation) as current operating costs or
charge them directly to the customer for whom the service is
performed.1
9 4
report of which inspection shall be kept on file for not less than 5
years which shall be available to any subsequent owner without
charge), except that a utility shall be required to make only one in-
spection of a residence unless a new owner requests a subsequent in-
spection;
(B) arrange to have the suggested measures installed (except for fur-
nace efficiency modifications with respect to which the inspection
prohibition of section 213(b)(2)(B) applies, unless the customer re-
quests in writing arrangements for such modifications in writing);
and
(C) arrange for a lender to make a loan to such residential customer to
finance the purchase and installation costs of suggested meas-
ures; ...
§215(b).





The program is simply taxation by regulation. 195 Costs will be shared
by many and benefits directly available for only a few. All utility
customers will have subsidized the promotion of solar energy, with
benefits redounding to the solar equipment industry, and to the affluent
who can meet the high initial capital costs of a conversion to solar energy.
The poor and lower middle classes will encounter greater difficulty in
securing the financing, 196 and thus often remain dependent on conven-
tional energy sources from the utilities, which are themselves caught in
an escalating fuel cost spiral.
Concern for the possible retardation of solar technology development
and for unfair competition is real and legitimate. Yet utility involvement
might be an impetus to technological advancement and improve rather
than harm competition. The issue can be best resolved by a careful
analysis of the manner of participation proposed by each utility, of the
market characteristics that will be affected by the proposed entry, and by
close monitoring of utility activities which are approved. In this respect
Congress has shown wisdom in adopting those provisions of the National
Energy Conservation Policy Act which allow utility entry only on an in-
dividual company basis after acquiring regulatory approval. Unfor-
tunately, the other statutory provisions which expand utility contacts
with their customers may serve to preclude regulatory authorization of
entry in those cases in which utility involvement appears to be beneficial.
Allowing Public Utilities to Compete
The dangers of utility participation have been analyzed above in con-
junction with the option of prohibiting utility entry.197 The discussion in
this section focuses on the advantages of competitive involvement of
public utilities, and on whether regulatory controls should accompany
that involvement. Many of the factors relevant to the analysis of the first
two options are equally applicable to the analysis of allowing the utilities
to compete.
Benefits of Utility Involvement
Public utility involvement might reduce the significance of the
economic barrier associated with using a solar system. The high initial
cost of solar equipment presents a barrier which utilities can help to over-
"
5See generally, Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sci. 22(1971).
'
6A recent enactment by Congress will help to aleviate some of the pressure. Section 242
of the National Energy Conservation Policy Act provides for the purchase by the Govern-
ment National Mortgage Association of loans for energy conserving improvements. Part 3
of the Act (§§241-48) deals with secondary financing and loan insurance for energy conser-
ving improvements and solar energy systems.
..
7See supra text accompanying notes 159-96.
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come by leases or sales and accompanying financing arrangements. 198 Of
course, utility involvement in the sale and leasing of solar equipment
offers no special financing advantage unless the utilities extend their in-
volvement further than private companies will. The utilities are certainly
accustomed to capital intensive investments. 99 Regulation, however,
while not removing all the risk from such business decisions, also affords
a hedge on the degree of risk involved, since the utilities are entitled to
the opportunity to earn a fair rate of return on capital properly invested.
Bad debts are part of operating expenses, 20 0 and their inclusion in rate
calculations serves to spread such losses to all customers. Subsequent
discussion indicates, however, the unlikelihood that investment expenses
for the sale and leasing of solar equipment will be included in a utility's
rate base.2 0 1 Thus the willingness of utilities to extend more attractive
financing arrangements than private companies must be predicated on
some other factor, such as significant beneficial load management con-
trols.
While increased utility access to the capital market could be a signifi-
cant advantage leading to extended involvement by the utilities,' 2 they
would again likely require solid security as well as major adivantages,
such as positive load management benefits, as a prerequisite to financing
decentralized solar equipment on a long-term basis. Public utilities have
historically enjoyed a very strong credit position evidenced by superior
bond ratings and low interest rates. 2°3 Their access, however, while still
superior to that of many businesses, has slipped significantly in recent
I'sHirshberg & Schoen, Barriers to the Widespread Utilization of Residential Solar
Energy: The Prospect for Solar Energy in the U.S. Housing Industry, 5 PoL. ScI. 453, 468
(1974).
The capital intensive nature of the electric utilities is the most significant cost
characteristic of the industry. The electric power companies not only require
more captial per year than any other industry, but they also need more money
invested in capital per dollar of revenue than any other manufacturing in-
dustry in the United States. Even the railroads and communications com-
panies require only two-thirds the amount of assets per dollar of revenue as
the electric utilities.
D. SCOTT, FINANCING THE GROWTH OF ELECTRIC UTILITIES 40 (1976).
200 Some commissions on some occasions have disallowed uncollectibles, but the
general practice is to recognize that any large business will have some un-
collectible accounts and that this is a normal cost of doing business. Fre-
quently, though, commissions impose or suggest operating procedures by
which uncollectibles can be minimized, or they establish percentage stan-
dards beyond which uncollectible amounts may be considered as stemming
from the faults or inefficiencies of the firm.
M. FARRIS & R. SAMPSON. supra note 74, at 99.
="'Infra notes 218-19 and 226 and accompanying text.
'See 1 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, supra note 189, at 148-49; Dean & Miller,
supra note 72, at 354.
203"High-grade utility bonds carried relatively low interest rates of 4.0 percent to 4.5 per-
cent, and the common stocks of utility and communications companies were highly
favored by investors, regularly trading at from 1.5 to over two times book value." La
Blanc & Luftig, What are the New Market Prospects for Raising Utility Capital? 97 PuB.
UTIL. FORT.. February 26, 1976, at 26. See also Fredman & Sharma, The Performance of




The initial high cost to the consumer of owning a solar system can be
avoided if the utility owns the solar system and charges the customer for
all the energy used without distinguishing the source or without
imposing a specific charge for the solar equipment. 0 5 Electricity and
natural gas prices are based on average cost.20 6 The lower cost of older
energy supplies is averaged with the higher cost of newer energy sup-
plies, and thus the price does not reflect current replacement cost.20 7 This
method of pricing creates an artificial economic barrier since solar
systems would be more competitive economically if incremental cost
were considered. Since utilities are continually required to obtain new
energy supplies at increasing costs, the utility would compare the cost
for using solar energy systems with the incremental cost of new supplies
of traditional energy forms. Solar energy would be economically viable
whenever able to compete with these incremental costs to the utility.
Another economic advantage could be realized from the utilities' ex-
isting customer service and billing network since they could be used to
cover solar equipment business at a lower cost than would be possible if
provided by an independent company.20 8 The major costs of computer
programming, paper and envelopes, addressing personnel and equip-
ment, and postage are already incurred by the utilities in billing for their
existing services. On-site inspections and maintenance services are
already performed by both natural gas and electric utility crews, and the
utilities are likely to have the capability of extending their training to
2
°
0Beginning in 1965 the utilities' position began deteriorating. Interest rates on the
utility bonds increased to exceed ten percent by 1975 and common stocks began to sell for
considerably less than book value. Utilities increased their long-term debt which, together
with the rising interest rates, led to declining coverage ratios and lower bond ratings.
LaBlanc & Luftig, supra note 203, at 26-29, 33. See also Rakes, Trends Affecting Power
Company Securities, 102 PUB. UTIL. FORT., August 31, 1978, at 31-32.
The overall rate of return on the electric utilities from 1965 to 1972, just
prior to the oil embargo, was an unsatisfactory 1.7 per cent. Considering the
high rates of inflation, the real rate of return to investors was substantially in
the negative area. Even though electric utility share prices advanced by
nearly 40 per cent from their lows in mid-1974 to their mid-1976 levels, these
equities were still selling about 10 per cent below book value in early 1977.
Fredman & Sharma, supra note 203, at 25. The recovery in the return on common equity in
the electric utilities was due to the large rate increases allowed from 1974 through 1977. Id
at 27.
"The gas utility equities, although not outstanding performers, exhibited somewhat bet-
ter performance generally than the electric over the 1965-76 period." Id The gas utilities
were not affected directly by the Arab oil embargo. Id "The electric utility industry is, of
course, much larger, more basic, more capital intensive, and thus more affected by changes
in interest rates than is the gas industry." Id at 25.2 5In contrast to selling or leasing solar equipment to individual consumers, some
utilities might prefer to retain complete ownership rights in the installed solar equipment.
The consumer would then be charged on a monthly basis for the total energy used, ir-
respective of whether the energy was solar generated.206Supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text.
2071 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. supra note 189, at 5, 23, 148.208Icd at 149; Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 354.
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cover solar systems.20 9
Utility marketing of solar equipment could substantially increase con-
sumer confidence in solar energy.210 It would demonstrate to the general
public that some traditional energy suppliers are now convinced of solar
energy's practicality. The record of utilities for providing reliable service
would be reassuring to many consumers, and thus they would be in a
position to strongly influence public opinion. Utilities, like any large per-
manently established business enterprise, would undoubtedly warrant
the products they sell or lease.
Finally, the utilities are in a unique position to significantly affect the
competitive viability of the solar resource. As the traditional utility
markets are penetrated by the solar alternatives, utility revenues are
likely to decrease. If the utilities view solar energy as economically
threatening, they are likely to resist its widespread adoption. If on the
other hand, they can participate in revenue-producing solar activities, the
utilities are more likely to actively seek a harmonious integration
between solar energy and conventional energy forms.
Controls on Utility Involvement
Assuming utilities have both the opportunity and desire to compete in
the commercialization of solar equipment, the question remains whether
their involvement should be regulated. Two levels of regulation should be
distinguished: One encompasses the entire solar equipment industry; the
other focuses only on utility activities in the field.
Some of the rationales for limiting entry to the field are similarly inap-
plicable for public regulation of a business. Three of those rationales,
specifically the existence of natural monopoly conditions, the limited
availability of physical resources, and cream-skimming, are not present
in solar commercialization and are therefore as equally unavailing to sup-
port any form of regulation as they were to favor limiting entry.211
Although the rationale of preventing destructive competition is equally
inadequate in limiting market entry, it does justify the promulgation of
solar equipment quality standards and financial responsibility re-
quirements for suppliers.2 12
The legal test of the propriety of subjecting an industry to regulation is
very broad. The Supreme Court in 1877 first articulated that regulation
is proper when a business is" 'affected with a public interest .... "213 In
1934 the Court stated that "affected with the public interest" is the
equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power, ' 21 4 and this
2 0 See 1 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT. supra note 189, at 23.21 Smackey, Should Electric Utilities Market Solar Energy? 102 PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
September 28, 1978, at 37.21 See supra notes 124-54 and accompanying text.212Supra notes 155-58 and accompanying text.2 13Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 126 (1877).2 4Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 531 (1934).
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standard is still applicable today. The Court summarized its position:
"The phrase 'affected with the public interest' can, in the nature of
things, mean no more than that an industry, for adequate reason, is sub-
ject to control for the public good.' 2 1 Given the general lack of consumer
knowledge about solar systems, their relation to the provision of
essential heating and cooling services, and the potential for unreliable or
unsafe units, regulation based on the public interest can be imposed on
the entire solar equipment industry.
Less certain, however, is whether existing utility regulation shiould be
extended to cover a utility's marketing activities. Such utility regulation
would apply only to utilities and not to manufacturers or suppliers in the
private sector. In other industries such extensions have been made when
necessary to protect an existing regulatory scheme. 16 A good example is
the regulation of cable television companies. Competition from the cable
companies sufficiently threatened licensed broadcasters to cause the
Federal Communications Commission to assert jurisdiction over the
entire cable television industry. 17
An extension of regulation would be a near certainty if the utility re-
tained all of the property rights in the installed solar system.2 1 8 Under
such an arrangement the utilities would market solar energy rather than
solar equipment. Capital investment in equipment and processes to
produce energy, and the distribution and sale of that energy, would
remain the utilities' primary functions. Regulation of quality of service
and pricing would still be necessary.
The utilities might be inclined to prefer such ownership arrangements
since utility regulation would inevitably follow. The benefit to the utility
would be the inclusion of its solar equipment investment in its rate base.
The rate of return allowed by the regulatory commission would thus
apply equally to this investment as to the expenditures for conventional
capital assets, and bad debt expenses resulting from customer accounts
would be allowable as an operating expense. The regulatory process
would thus provide security in the form of a guaranteed realistic oppor-
21 1d. at 536.
2 6D. BOLES & P. VERKUIL. supra note 129, at 76.2 7In 1965 the Federal Communications Commission issued its First Report and Order on
Community Antenna Television System Regulation, 38 F.C.C 683, modified, 1 F.C.C.2d
524 (1965).
Although that report was restricted to those systems served by microwave
relays, the conclusions were more relevant to all CATV systems. For example,
the FCC found that "the likelihood or probability of adverse impact [lby
CATV] upon potential and existing service has become too substantial to be
dismissed." (1 F.C.C.2d at 713-14.) The FCC found that CATV created
"substantial competition" for local licensees (1 F.C.C.2d at 707) which, while
it cannot be measured precisely, has a "substantial negative effect upon sta-
tion audience and revenues...." (1 F.C.C.2d at 710-711).
BOlES & VERKUIL. supra note 129, at 91. In the Second Report and Order on CATV System
Regulation, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966) the FCC asserted jurisdiction over all cable television
systems. The jurisdiction was challenged and upheld in United States v. Southwestern




tunity to earn an established rate of return on its invested capital. Such a
benefit could be particularly attractive to the utilities during the early
stages of solar technology application.
Extension of the regulatory process, while affording some benefits to
both consumers and the public, also poses a significant danger.
Regulation does protect the public interest.2 9 In return for monopoly
positions in their service areas and the security associated with rate
regulation, the utilities are obligated to provide safe and adequate service
under maximum rate restrictions.20 The regulatory scheme, however,
creates a strong inducement for the utility to overcapitalize. The rate of
return established by a regulatory commission is applied only to the utili-
ty's rate base, which is calculated as the gross valuation of the utility
property less the accrued depreciation. 2 ' Operation and maintenance ex-
penses incurred in utility operations are recoverable, but the rate of
return does not apply to them. Because the extent of any profit which can
be realized is thus limited by the size of the rate base and the amount of
the allowed rate of return, a strong inducement exists for the utilities to
make investments in capital assets and thereby expand their rate bases.
This inducement has been named after Averch, Johnson, and Wellisz and
is known as the "A-J-W effect."222
Utility ownership of solar systems could give rise to the A-J-W effect.
The desire to inflate the rate base might lead the utilities to overinvest by
installing systems having greater capacity than is consistent with total
cost efficiency. " To the extent that utilities must compete with private
solar firms this tendency would be balanced by the recognition that the
utility might eventually price itself out of the market. The A-J-W effect
19Contra, Jordan, Producer Protection, Prior Market Structure and the Effects of
Government Regulation, 15 J. OF L. & ECON. 151 (1972).
1 O2 See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.22Supra note 45.
2 2 See generally, Averch & Johnson, Behavior of the Firm under Regulatory Constrain4
52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962); Wellisz, Regulation of Natural Gas Pipeline Companies: An
Economic Analysis, 71 J. POL ECON. 30 (1963).213Kahn argues that the likelihood of this distortion is greatly diminished by regulatory
lag.
Observe that the A-J-W tendency prevails only to the extent that regulation
approaches instantaneous effectiveness in holding realized rates of return to
a single, legally prescribed level. Only in these circumstances could regulated
companies, without fear of loss, undertake investments the marginal product
of which fell short of their cost of capital: only if the rate of return that they
were previously earning was already at the legal minimum and only if, after
these investments were made, rates could instantaneously be raised on the in-
elastic portions of the business to hold the return to that mimimum would
there be no losses to offset the benefit of the expanded rate base. Only if, to
look at it from the opposite direction, all reductions in cost were instan-
taneously accompanied by equivalent rate reductions, so as instantaneously
to take those cost-savings away from them, could regulated companies afford
to have no compunctions about adopting excessively capital-intensive, hence
cost-inflating methods of production.
2 A. KAHN, supra note 124, at 56.
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could nevertheless still lead to distortions. Since the public utilities co--id
not earn any profit on expenses incurred in the maintenance of their
decentralized solar systems, they would have a clear incentive to invest
in the higher cost systems requiring less maintenance.
In addition to overcapitalizing, a utility owning solar equipment could
be influenced by the A-J-W effect to reach out for additional business,
even though the rates on it are unremunerative. If the new business
yields less net revenues than the allowed rate of return, utilities may be
able to have the rates on other services raised to bring their total
revenues up to the allowed level.2 24 Low rates on the new business are
likely when the demand is sensitive to price and competition exists since
such rates will attract new business which can then be used to augment
the rate base.2 5 Utilities owning solar systems might underprice the
solar component of their services in order to more effectively compete
against private suppliers and then recoup the lost portion of revenues by
raising rates for conventional services where demand is less sensitive to
price and the utility enjoys a monopoly position.
Regardless of the extension of utility regulation, the A-J-W effect is
not likely to occur if the utility sells or leases the solar equipment.
Although regulation is an essential prerequisite for the A-J-W effect, not
all regulation is sufficient to give rise to its tendencies. The A-J-W effect
applies only to the expenses allowed in the rate base, which under most
regulation have been limited to capital investments undertaken to supply
utility energy services. Utility costs in programs such as appliance sales
have not been included.2 6 The utilities' expenses in acquiring solar equip-
ment for sales and leasing is therefore not likely to be included in the rate
base.
The sales and leasing forms of utility involvement present their own
potential problems. Internal or cross-subsidization is possible whether
the solar commercialization activities are carried out by the regulated
utility or a nonregulated subsidiary. 27 Under either form of business
organization, joint expenses will be incurred which must be allocated
between the traditional utility service and the solar activities. Examples
of such common expenses include advertising, service calls, and shared
office costs. If an excessive portion of these expenses are allocated to
utility activities covered by the rate schedules, a utility would be unfairly
using its monopoly position in those traditional service activities to sub-
224I at 49.
221Id at 54.
"16 Re Intermountain Gas Co., 67 P.U.R.3d 511 (1967); supra note 188.
22'The problem posed here is the fair allocation of joint costs which would be shared in
providing conventional utility service and solar equipment. See D. BOIES & P. VERKUIL.
supra note 129, at 113-14. It should not be confused with the common problem of
regulating transactions entered into between affiliated enterprises wherein one affiliate




sidize its solar energy business. 228 This potential proble-m is by no means
unique to utility involvement in solar energy, however.22 9 Accounting re-
quirements and controls over transactions with affiliates, although con-
sidered inadequate by some, already exist and can surely be applied to
sales and leasing of solar equipment if utility participation is otherwise
desirable.
Although marketing of solar equipment by utilities would provide a
number of benefits in furtherance of the development of solar energy,
concern centers on how to best control utility involvement. If the utility
owned outright all of the property rights in an installed system, existing
regulation would almost inevitably be extended to cover the solar opera-
tions. Extension of the regulatory process raises the potential danger of
overcapitalization by a utility. On the other hand, marketing solar equip-
ment through separate non-regulated operations may lead to the problem
of internal or cross-subsidization.
CONCLUSION
The technological development of solar energy exploitation is substan-
tially more advanced than the legal analysis of the subject. Yet the pace
of its adoption and development depends to a large extent on the
resolution of certain legal problems. The exact role that solar energy will
play in contributing to the satisfaction of future energy needs will be
materially affected by the nature and the adequacy of the legal responses
which are selected for the purpose of developing and encouraging its use.
The nature of the interface between solar energy and the public utilities
will be significant in determining the competitive viability of solar power
as an alternative energy resource. With vested interests tied strongly to
conventional energy sources, some utilities might view solar use as a
competitive threat and thus choose to hinder its development. Other
utilities, however will just as predictably desire to become directly
involved with the utilization of solar technology. This utility role raises
concern over the ability of solar firms to successfully compete. Conse-
quently, regulators and policy-makers will not be dealing with a uniform
attitude on the part of the utilities or the general public. Furthermore,
the levels of competitive interaction of utility participation in solar
development are varied and include pricing for solar backup service, the
utilization of multi-user solar systems, and utility involvement in the
22
'See Dean & Miller, supra note 72, at 353-54, citing Noll, Public Utilities and Solar
Energy Development (1976) (unpublished paper). See also R. BEZDEK, ANALYSIS OF POLICY
OPTIONS FOR ACCELERATING COMMERICALIZATION OF SOLAR HEATING AND COOLING SYSTEMS
225-26 (1977).
"'For a discussion of problems in rate making and profits to affiliates see Note, Treat-
ment ofAffiliated Transactions in Utility Rate Making: Western Electric Company and the
Bell System, 56 B. U. L. REv. 558 (1976); Oldham, Rate Base Determination and Profits to
Affiliates, 39 COLO. L. REV. 509 (1967).
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marketing of solar equipment. Simple, singular policies are, therefore,
not likely to be successful.
One basic principle is available to guide the direction of our national
policy and legal response. Alternative energy sources must be developed
and harmoniously integrated into our existing energy structure. Existing
and projected shortages make the need for additional energy evident. The
needs and interests of energy consumers, utilities, businesses, and the na-
tion dictate that each be considered in formulating an energy policy in
which new energy resources play a significant role. The new federal
energy legislation, particularly the National Energy Conservation Policy
Act, represent a step in the right direction, but a great deal of work
remains to be done.
